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Fox: Constitutional Law - First Amendment Review of Beef Check-off Ass

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - First Amendment Review of Beef Checkoff Assessments; Beef May Be for Dinner, But May Producers Be Compelled to Say So? Livestock Marketing Association v. United States Department ofAgriculture, 335 F.3d 711 (8th Cir. 2003).
INTRODUCTION

Beef believers and veggie variants alike are by now surely conditioned to the tell-tale advertising sounds designed to remind us what we
really want for dinner. The opening strings of Aaron Copland's "Rodeo"
stimulate our senses, making us receptive to the dependable and reassuring
voice of Sam Elliott informing us that beef not only satisfies our more extravagant culinary desires, but fits into an active and healthy lifestyle as well.
Anyone with a television or who pays more than passing attention to
print advertisement is likely to be familiar with the long-running "Beef.It's
What's For Dinner." advertising campaign, as well as many other generic
advertising slogans that are designed to promote consumption of various
agricultural commodities. But most consumers exposed to such messages
likely have no idea that these marketing campaigns are initiated, funded, and
designed by the producers of the commodities themselves, under the authority of what is commonly called a "checkoff' program.' The term "checkoff'
refers to the fixed, per-unit fee that producers are required by law to pay into
the program each time they market a unit of the pertinent commodity.2
Those fees in turn are utilized for research, promotion, and informational
activities designed to maintain and expand markets for the commodity, advance the welfare of persons engaged in production, marketing, and consumption of the commodity, and enhance overall market demand for the
commodity.3
Authorization for certain checkoff programs, including the beef
1.
See United States Dep't of Agric., Research and Promotion Programs,available at
http://www.ams.usda.gov/Isg/mpb/lsrp.htL "Commonly referred to as 'check-off' programs,
they operate under promotion and research orders or agreements issued by the Secretary of
Agriculture and are financed by industry-established assessments." Id.
2. - Id. The rate of assessment varies by commodity and may be either a flat fee per unit
marketed or a percentage based on the market value of each unit marketed. See, e.g., United
States Dep't of Agric., Beef Promotion and Research Order, available at http://www.ams.
usda.gov/lsg/mpb/beef/beefchk.htm (noting that beef checkoff program is funded by a mandatory assessment of $1-per-head collected each time cattle are sold); United States Dep't of
Agric., Pork Promotion, Research and Consumer Information Order, available at http://
www.ams.usda.gov/lsg/mpb/pork/porkchk.htm (noting that pork checkoff is funded by a
mandatory assessment of 0.4 of 1 percent on the market value of all hogs sold); United States
Dep't of Agric., Soybean Promotion and Research Program, available at http://www.ams.
usda.gov/Isg/mpb/rp-soy.htm (noting that soybean checkoff is funded by a mandatory assessment of 0.5 of I percent of the net market price of soybeans).
3.
See, e.g., Commodity Promotion, Research, and Indus. Info. Act of 1996, 7 U.S.C. §
7411 (a) (1999).
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checkoff, is provided by a commodity-specific statute designed specifically
to establish the checkoff itself Most checkoff programs, however, and particularly those authorized for fruits and vegetables, exist as just one of a
number of regulatory components of a broader marketing order authorized
by the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 19375 Others are authorized by the Commodity Promotion, Research, and Information Act of 1996,
which provides for the creation of a checkoff program upon either the discretion of the Secretary of the United States Department of Agriculture ("the
Secretary") or the submission of a proposal by a qualified party.6
Congress established the beef checkoff in 1985 with the passage of
the Beef Promotion and Research Act ("the Act") The Act authorized the
Secretary to promulgate an initial Beef Promotion and Research Order ("the
Order") to implement the program, which was to be followed by a nationwide referendum of qualified producers.' That referendum was conducted in
1988, wherein a majority of producers voted to continue the program.9
Since then, individual cattle producers and beef importers have continued to
contribute one dollar for each head of cattle marketed to program activities,
with the bulk of funds allocated to generic commercial advertising for beef. 0

See, e.g., Beef Promotion and Research Act of 1985, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2918 (1999);
4.
Pork Promotion, Research, and Consumer Info. Act of 1985, 7 U.S.C. §§ 4801-4819 (1999);
Watermelon Research and Promotion Act of 1985, 7 U.S.C. §§ 4901-4916 (1999 & Supp.
2003). Soybean Promotion, Research, and Consumer Info. Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 6301-6311 (1999
& Supp. 2003); Cotton Research and Promotion Act of 1966, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2118 (1999);
Dairy Prod. Stabilization Act of 1983, 7 U.S.C. §§ 4501-4514 (1999 & Supp. 2003); Haas
Avocado Promotion, Research, and Info. Act of 2000, 7 U.S.C. 9§ 7801-7813 (1999 & Supp.
2003); Popcorn Promotion, Research, and Consumer Info. Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 7481-7491
(1999).

5. Act of June 3, 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-137, 50 Stat. 2467 (codified as amended at 7
U.S.C. § 601-626 (1999 & Supp. 2003)).
7 U.S.C. §§ 7411-7425 (1999). Such proposals may be submitted by "an association
6.
of producers of the agricultural commodity" or "any other person that may be affected by the
issuance of an order with respect to the agricultural commodity." Id. at § 7413(b)(l)(B)(i)(ii). Consideration of submitted proposals is discretionary, but the Secretary "shall publish
the proposed order" and initiate notice and comment rulemaking if she determines the proposal is "consistent with and will effectuate the purpose of this subchapter." Id. at §
7413(b)(2).
7.
7 U.S.C. § 2901-2911 (1999).
8. Id. § 2903-2906.
9.

See United States Dep't of Agric., Beef Promotion and Research Order, available at

http://www.ams.usda.gov/lsg/mpb/beef/beefchk.htm. Of the 256,505 valid ballots cast in the
May 10, 1988, referendum, 78.91 percent of cattle producers and importers voting favored the
program. Id.
10.
See 2002 Beef Bd. Annual Report, Indep. Auditors' Report Statement of Revenues,
Expenses, and Changes in Fund Balances for the fiscal year ending Sept., 2002 (hereinafter
2002 Beef Bd. Annual Report). Out of a total of $46.5 million collected from producer assessments and interest income earned during fiscal year 2002, 55.3 percent went to domestic
consumer promotion (advertising), followed by 12.4 percent to consumer information, 11.1
percent to foreign marketing, and 11.0 percent to research. Id. The balance was allocated to
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol4/iss1/9
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In Livestock Marketing Association v. United States Department of
Agriculture, a group of beef producers claimed that the generic advertising
conducted pursuant to the beef checkoff program violated their First
Amendment rights to freedom of speech and freedom of association." The
producers asserted that they disagreed with the program's content and should
not be compelled to financially support speech with which they disagree.
In the lower court proceeding, the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota held the beef checkoff was unconstitutional "because it
requires plaintiffs to pay, in part, for speech to which the plaintiffs object."'"
The issue before a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit was whether the mandatory beef checkoff assessment represented an
impermissible regulation of speech that violated the appellees' First
Amendment right to freedom of speech. 4
The Court of Appeals upheld the District Court decision, finding
that "the Beef Act and the Beef Order are unconstitutional and unenforceable.""5 In reaching its conclusion, the court interpreted and applied the
United States Supreme Court's commercial speech doctrine, a still-evolving
body of law that applies varying degrees of First Amendment scrutiny to
actions either restricting commercial speech or compelling financial support
for such speech.'6 Specifically, the court looked to Supreme Court decisions
in Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc. and United States v. United
Foods, the only two cases where the Supreme Court has applied the commercial speech doctrine in the context of commodity checkoff programs."
Adopting a modified version of a test that had been rejected by the Court in
both Glickman and United Foods, the court concluded that "the government's interest in protecting the welfare of the beef industry by compelling
all beef producers and importers to pay for generic beef advertising is not
items such as industry information, producer communications, program evaluation, and administration. Id.
11.
Livestock Mktg. Ass'n v. United States Dep't of Agric., 335 F.3d 711, 715 (8th Cir.

2003).
12. Id.
at 721.
13. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n v.United States Dep't of Agric., 207 F.Supp. 2d 992, 1002
(D.S.D.2002).
14.

Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 335 F.3d at 721. The court noted that:
[I]f appellees' First Amendment claim challenged only the fact that they
are being compelled to contribute to a collective fund, their claim would
implicate only their free association right. However, because appellees
are additionally challenging the use of those funds to pay for disfavored
speech, their claim predominantly implicates their free speech right.

Id. n.6.
15.
Id. at 726.
16.
For a complete discussion of the commercial speech doctrine, see infra notes 34-85
and accompanying text.
17.
For a complete discussion of Gliclknan and United Foods, see infra notes 86-145 and
accompanying text.
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sufficiently substantial to justify the infringement on appellees' First
Amendment free speech right."' 8
While agreeing with the holding, this case note will argue that the
Eighth Circuit's strained analysis unnecessarily confuses First Amendment

scrutiny of the checkoff program at issue in the principal case. Initially, this
note will present the statutory history and specific provisions of the Act.
Next, the note will detail the case law history of the United States Supreme
Court's commercial speech doctrine, beginning with a discussion of First
Amendment review of actions that restrict commercial speech as well as
actions that compel either speech itself or the funding of speech in both ideological and commercial contexts." The case law history will continue by
reviewing the application of the commercial speech doctrine in Glickran
and United Foods, and will conclude with an overview of subsequent lower
court decisions reviewing agricultural checkoff programs. This note will
then present the principal case, followed by an analysis of the manner in
which the Eighth Circuit manufactured its own test. The analysis will argue
that the court not only embraced a legal standard expressly rejected by the
United States Supreme Court in resolving First Amendment challenges to
checkoff programs, but also largely ignored a more appropriate standard
utilized by the Court in the strikingly similar United Foods decision. Finally, in identifying the proper standard to be applied in the present case, this
note will consider the application of both Glickmnan and United Foods, and
propose a more coherent and protective legal framework based on the historical underpinnings of the commercial speech doctrine.
BACKGROUND

Statutory history
Congress adopted the Act in 1985 as part of that year's comprehensive "farm bill," the Food Security Act of 1985, legislation that reauthorized
and amended existing statutes governing federal farm payments, food assistance, and a host of other programs.20 The Act's findings extolled the importance of beef in the human diet, recognized the economic importance of the
beef industry to the nation's economy, and identified the maintenance and
expansion of beef markets as an issue of vital importance to the industry and
the nation." Congress therefore declared it to be in the public interest to
18.

Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 335 F.3d at 725-26.

19.
This note will not analyze application of the government speech doctrine, which was
relied upon by both the appellants in the principal case and the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in United States v. Frame, 885 F.2d 1119 (3d Cir. 1989). For a
discussion of Frame,see infra notes 146-50 and accompanying text.

20.
Food Sec. Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-198, 99 Stat. 1354 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.).
21.

7 U.S.C. § 2901(a) (1999).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol4/iss1/9
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establish a "coordinated program of promotion and research" aimed at
strengthening the industry economically and building on markets both domestic and foreign.22 The program is similar in purpose and in form to other
such "self-help" checkoff programs authorized for various other agricultural
commodities.23
In furtherance of these findings and declaration, the Act authorized
the Secretary to promulgate regulations creating the Order, which governed
the formation of the Cattlemen's Beef Promotion and Research Board ("the
Board") and Operating Committee.24 Qualified state beef councils and importers nominate members to the Board, who are then appointed by the Secretary.25 The number of members appointed to serve on the Board and the
geographic representation of that membership are determined by the cattle
inventory in various states.26 The number of importer representatives is determined similarly based on the conversion of import volumes to live animal
equivalents.27 The Board elects ten of its members to the Operating Committee, which is supplemented by ten other members elected separately by a
federation of the state beef councils.2" Responsibilities of the Operating
Committee include development of plans, projects, and budgets.2 9
Subsequent to the Secretary's promulgation of the Order, the Act required an affirmative vote of cattle producers in a nationwide referendum in
order to continue the program."a That initial referendum was conducted in
1988, and the Order was approved.3 The Act prohibits the use of any funds
collected under the Order for the purpose of influencing government policy,

22.
Id. § 2901(b).
23.
See, e.g., id. § 2611-2627 (1999) (potato research and promotion); id. § 4501-4514
(1999 & Supp. 2003) (dairy promotion program).
24.
See id. § 2903(b) (promulgation of the Order); id. § 2904(1) (establishment of the
Board); id. § 2904(A) (election of the Operating Committee).
25.
Id. § 2904(1). A qualified state beef council is defined as "a beef promotion entity
that is authorized by State statute or is organized and operating within a State, that receives
voluntary contributions and conducts beef promotion, research, and consumer information
programs, and that is recognized by the Board as the beef promotion entity within such
State[.]" Id. § 2902(14).
26.
Id. § 2904(l)(B). States with more than 500,000 head of cattle will be represented by
at least one Board member, and those with less than 500,000 head will be grouped with other
similarly situated states, to the extent practicable, in geographically contiguous units. Id.
States earn one additional Board representative for each additional one million head of cattle
over the 500,000 head threshold. Id.
27.
Id. § 2904(l)(B).
28.
Id. § 2904(4)(A).
29.
Id. § 2904(4)(B)-(D).
30.
Id. § 2906(a).
31.
Livestock Mktg. Ass'n v. United States Dep't of Agric., 335 F.3d 711, 714 (8th Cir.
2003). Additional referenda to consider the continuation of the program may be initiated
upon request to the Secretary by a representative group comprising at least ten percent of the
number of cattle producers. 7 U.S.C. § 2906(b).
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2004
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other than recommending amendments to the Order.32 In carrying out the
Act, the Secretary is authorized to issue orders restraining or preventing producers from violating the Order,
and may assess civil penalties of not more
33
than $5,000 for such violation.
Case law history
In considering First Amendment challenges to commodity checkoff
programs, courts have relied upon a body of United States Supreme Court
cases that constitute the commercial speech doctrine. That doctrine embodies not just scrutiny of the validity of state actions that place restrictions on
the free exercise of commercial speech, but also those actions that may compel individuals to engage in or finance speech with which they disagree.
This section discusses case law pertinent to the development of the doctrine
with respect to both restricted and compelled commercial speech, and reviews application of the doctrine to cases involving First Amendment challenges to commodity checkoff programs.
1. First Amendment scrutiny of restrictions on commercial speech
The degree of First Amendment protection afforded commercial
speech has evolved considerably during the past thirty years?4 Until the
1970s, commercial speech was regarded as another form of commerce that
could be regulated without regard to First Amendment issues.3" The Supreme Court initially defined commercial speech as speech that does "no
more than propose a commercial transaction," a definition that focused primarily on commercial advertising. 6 The landmark ruling in Virginia State
Board of Pharmacyv. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. represented
a turning point wherein the Court recognized that the First Amendment does
protect commercial speech from unwarranted governmental regulations. 3 7 In
32.
7 U.S.C. § 2904(10) (1999).
33.
Id. § 2908.
34.
Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Prot. of CommercialSpeech Under FirstAmendmentSupreme Court Cases, 164 A.L.R. FED 1, 11-12 (2000).
35.
Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (upholding New York ordinance

prohibiting distribution of commercial handbills on the street). According to the Court, the
Constitution imposes no "restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising."
Id.
36.
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385
(1973).
37.
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770
(1976). While Virginia Pharmacy represents the touchstone case in the evolution of the doctrine, Justice Blackmun, in writing that opinion, recognized similar movement toward First
Amendment protection in other cases. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826
(1975). In reversing a conviction for violation of a Virginia statute prohibiting any publication promoting abortion in that state, the Court held that "the Virginia courts erred in their
assumptions that advertising, as such, was entitled to no First Amendment protection ....
Id. at 825.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol4/iss1/9
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that case, the Court held that a state may not "completely suppress the dissemination of concededly truthful information about entirely lawful activity., ' 38 In striking down a Virginia statute prohibiting licensed pharmacists
from advertising prescription drug prices, the Court spoke out against the
"highly paternalistic approach" chosen by the legislature, preferring the alternative where "people will perceive their own best interests if only they are
well enough informed."39 Both consumers and society in general have an
"interest in the free flow of commercial information," and the former's interest in such information may at times be even greater than his or her interest
in political matters and other more protected forms of speech.' On the other
hand, speech that is false or misleading in any way "has never been protected for its own sake."' The Court confidently predicted that "commonsense differences" would allow states to differentiate between "other varieties" of speech that are afforded greater First Amendment protection and
varieties of commercial speech that may be regulated to ensure the truthfulness of its content.42 In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist did not share that optimism, writing that the dividing line between "truthful" and "false and misleading" commercial speech is actually quite blurry. 43 Moreover, legislatures could quite properly draw the initial line between higher and lower
forms of speech in accordance with the First Amendment, a line of reasoning
consistent with the earlier doctrine that deferred to the regulation of commercial speech as a form of commerce."
In the term following Virginia Pharmacy, the Court reinforced this
shift toward protecting truthful commercial speech by extending First
Amendment protection to the truthful advertising of legal services in Bates v.
State Bar of Arizona.4 s Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, indicated
that the bar's justifications for prohibiting price advertising for legal services
were impermissibly based on keeping the public ignorant rather than allowing them to be "trusted with correct but incomplete information."
However, one year later in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association, the Court upheld a bar association rule that prevented lawyers from engaging in aggressive in-person solicitation of potential clients as part of the association's
38.
Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 773.
39.
Id. at 770. Justice Blackmun noted that the Virginia legislature was free to regulate
the pharmacy profession or protect them from competition in various ways, but "it may not do
so by keeping the public in ignorance of the entirely lawful terms that competing pharmacists
are offering." Id.
40.
Id. at 763.
41.
Id.at 771.
42.
Id. at 772 n.24.
43.
Id. at 787 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
44.
Id.
45.
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977) (reversing a state court ruling
upholding a state bar association rule prohibiting the advertising of prices for routine legal

services).
46.

Id. at 375.
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standards of professional ethics.47 To uphold the bar's prohibition, Ohralik
distinguished such solicitation techniques from the types of truthful advertising that were before the Court in Bates, as well as other "forms of speech
more traditionally within the concern of the First Amendment.' ' 8 Echoing
the line drawn between truthful and false or misleading speech in Virginia
Pharmacy, First Amendment protection would not be extended where the
government has a "'compelling' interest in preventing those aspects of solicitation that involve fraud, undue influence, intimidation, overreaching, and
other forms of 'vexatious conduct."' 49
The Court upset this distinction between truthful and false or misleading commercial speech in 1980 by holding in Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corporation v. Public Service Commission of New York that First
Amendment protection could be limited with respect to all forms of commercial speech, including truthful speech.5" Central Hudson involved a
challenge to a regulation promulgated by the state regulator of utilities that
banned all promotional advertising by electric utility companies, ostensibly
as a means of conserving energy.5 ' In reaching its decision, the Court set
forth a four-part analytical framework to use in balancing the right to express
the commercial speech in question against the state's interest in suppressing
it:
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is
protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech
to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful
activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries
yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted,
and whether it is5 2not more extensive than is necessary to
serve that interest.
In applying the test, the Central Hudson Court found the first three prongs
were satisfied, but held that the advertising ban violated the fourth prong
because the regulation, as enacted, was "more extensive than necessary to
serve the state interest." 3

47.

Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447,448 (1978).

48.
49.

Id.at 455.
Id.at 462.

Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566
50.
(1980)
51.
52.

Id.at 558-59.
Id.at 566.

53.

Id. at 572. The four prongs were applied as follows: (1) advertising by a monopoly

supplier of electricity is protected by the First Amendment because such suppliers compete
with alternative forms of energy in several markets; (2) the state's interest in energy conservahttps://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol4/iss1/9
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The net effect of CentralHudson upon the Ohralik status quo was to
subject even truthful, nonmisleading speech restrictions to a lower, intermediate standard of review. 4 In formulating the first prong of the test, the
Court stated that "there can be no constitutional objection to the suppression
of commercial messages that do not accurately inform the public about lawful activity."" This merely disposed of any question regarding commercial
speech that is false, misleading, or related to unlawful activity; the type that
had been walled off from First Amendment protection in Virginia Pharmacy."' The second prong, whereby the state "must assert a substantial interest to be achieved by restrictions on commercial speech," broadened the
scope of commercial speech that might be regulated beyond the variety at
issue in Ohralik.5" If a substantial interest is identified, the third and fourth
prongs serve as a means by which the restriction may be invalidated either
because it does not directly bear on the governmental interest or it is not
narrowly tailored in advancing that interest.5 8
Although Central Hudson opened the door to permitting the restriction of truthful commercial speech, it has in practice provided the Court with
a flexible and generally deferential means of reviewing such impositions. 9
tion and preservation of fair and efficient electricity prices was substantial; (3) because of an
immediate connection between advertising and demand for electricity the regulation directly
advances the state's interest; but (4) the regulation was more restrictive than necessary in that
it "suppresses speech that in no way impairs the State's interest in energy conservation." Id.
at 567-70.
54.
Nicole B. Casarez, Don't Tell Me What To Say: Compelled Commercial Speech and
The FirstAmendment, 63 Mo. L. REv. 929, 947 (1998). As enunciated by Justice Blackmun
in a concurring opinion, this "intermediate level of scrutiny" allows suppression of commercial speech "whenever it 'directly advances' a 'substantial' governmental interest and is 'not
more extensive than necessary to serve that interest."' Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 573
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
55.
Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563.
56.
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
771-72 (1976) (holding that a state may permissibly regulate some forms of commercial
speech, including that which is false, misleading, or illegal).
57.
Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564. While Ohralik dealt specifically with the potentially
"overreaching" nature of a lawyer's in-person solicitation of potential clients, the Court in
that case went further in identifying the state's interest as "protecting the lay public"-a
broader field of interest that Central Hudson stepped in to occupy. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar
Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447,468 (1978).
58.
At least one commentator has noted that the fourth prong's "least restrictive alternative" requirement has, in subsequent cases, been reformulated as a requirement that "the
regulation must be narrowly tailored to achieve the government's goal."
ERWiN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTrTrrIONAL LAW PRINcIPLEs AND PoucIEs § 11.3.7.3, at 1050 (2d ed.
2002).
59.
Casarez, supra note 54, at 939 ("By embracing both anti-patemalism rhetoric in some
commercial speech cases and pro-paternalism results in others, the Court provided itself with
precedent to do anything it pleased with respect to advertising."). See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 478 (1995) (striking down a federal law that prohibited brewers from
publishing alcohol content on their labels in order to prevent "strength wars" between brewers
under both the third and fourth prongs of Central Hudson); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery
Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 412 (1993) (striking down a Cincinnati ordinance designed to
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That flexibility is evident in the significant differences in approach that subsequently emerged from the bench, differences that contributed to a plurality
opinion in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island.'° There, the Court struck
down a Rhode Island law prohibiting off-premises advertising of retail liquor prices by liquor retailers." In a plurality opinion, Justice Stevens echoed
the anti-paternalist underpinnings of Virginia Pharmacy with the reminder
that the "First Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations
that seek to keep people in the dark for what the government perceives to be
their own good."62 He also stressed the distinction between two categories
of commercial speech:
When a State regulates commercial messages to protect consumers from misleading, deceptive, or aggressive sales practices, or requires the disclosure of beneficial consumer information, the purpose of its regulation is consistent with the
reasons for according constitutional protection to commercial speech and therefore justifies less than strict review.
However, when a State entirely prohibits the dissemination
of truthful, nonmisleading commercial messages for reasons
unrelated to the preservation of a fair bargaining process,
there is far less reason to depart from the rigorous review
that the First Amendment generally demands.63
This suggests that regulations either restricting misleading and untruthful messages or compelling the disclosure of beneficial information
should be afforded deference, while restrictions on truthful commercial
speech should be subject to strict scrutiny." In spite of the fact that the advertising under consideration in 44 Liquormart was truthful, not misleading,
and otherwise lawful, a plurality of the Court proceeded to apply the intermediate scrutiny of CentralHudson and struck down the Rhode Island law

improve sidewalk safety and appearance that banned newsracks dispensing free periodicals
but not those dispensing newspapers for sale because it failed the "reasonable fit" test). But
see Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) (upholding
a state regulation prohibiting private commercial solicitations on campus facilities because the
fit between the regulatory interest and the restriction itself need be only "reasonable" instead
of the least restrictive available); Posadas de P.R. Associates v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S.
328, 331 (1986) (upholding a ban on truthful casino advertising that applied to Puerto Rican
residents but not to tourists).
60.
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
61.
Id. at 488. The asserted state interest was in "reducing alcohol consumption." Id. at
504.
62.
Id. at 503.
63.
Id. at 501.
64.
See generally Casarez, supra note 54, at 945 ("[44 Liquormart] practically guarantees
that restrictions on truthful, nonmisleading commercial information about lawful commodities
are invalid, regardless of whether the Central Hudson test is used or not.").

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol4/iss1/9
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for failing the third and fourth prongs."' In a concurring opinion, Justice
Thomas spoke out against the Central Hudson test and urged a return to Virginia Pharmacy, endorsing Justice Blackmun's concurrence in that case
"that all attempts to dissuade legal choices by citizens by keeping them ignorant are impermissible."
2. Compelled speech
A widely quoted passage from West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette reflects the established notion that First Amendment freedom of speech protections extend to those who wish to not speak at all: "If
there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official,
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,
religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or
act their faith therein."6' 7 As reflected in that passage, protection against
compelled speech, or what may be regarded as "negative free speech" rights,
has been recognized in a variety of ideological and non-commercial contexts.6 Even in instances where fully protected non-commercial speech is
inextricably intertwined with commercial speech, the Court will treat it as a
whole as a "fully protected expression" and apply a strict level of scrutiny.69
The Court made clear in Zauderer v. Office of DisciplinaryCounsel
of the Supreme Court of Ohio, however, that instances in which the compelled speech is commercial in nature warrant a lesser degree of protection
than that afforded to ideological and other non-commercial forms.7" In that
case, the appellant was challenging an Ohio disciplinary rule that required
contingency fee lawyers to state in their advertising that unsuccessful clients

65.
44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 504-08. Although Justice Stevens' invocation of strict
scrutiny for restrictions on truthful advertising accorded with Virginia Pharmacy, he applied
Central Hudson to argue that the state's interest in encouraging temperance was not directly
advanced by a proven link between advertised prices and consumption (third prong) and
could be achieved by alternative means such as increased taxes that would not restrict speech
(fourth prong). Id.
66.
Id. at 526 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and in judgment).
67.
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
68.
See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 559
(1995) (holding that the state cannot require private parade organizers to allow marchers to
participate who advocate incompatible views); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 US. 705, 713 (1977)
(holding that the state cannot require its citizens to display the state motto on their license
plates); Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (holding that the state
cannot require newspaper to provide reply space to candidates for political office who had
been criticized in print).
69.
Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988) (holding that
the state cannot compel professional fundraisers to disclose to potential donors the historical
proportion of funds devoted to charity).
70.
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S.
626, 651 (1985) ("[Tlhe interests at stake in this case are not of the same order as those discussed in Wooley, Tornillo, and Barnette.").
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would still be responsible for litigation expenses.7 While the Court acknowledged that "compulsion to speak" had been declared a violation of the
First Amendment in Barnette, Wooley, and Tornillo-cases involving noncommercial speech-they distinguished the "interests at stake in this case"
as not being of the same order.72 Recognizing that "the extension of First
Amendment protection to commercial speech is justified principally by the
value to consumers of the information such speech provides, appellant's
constitutionally protected interest in not providing any particular factual
information in his advertising is minimal."73 The Court noted that Virginia
Pharmacy had first advanced the notion that such compelled disclosures
might be a preferable alternative to restricting commercial speech.74 Based
on these considerations, a more deferential level of review was afforded in
holding that the rights of advertisers are sufficiently protected "as long as
disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the State's interest in preventing deception of consumers."75 In upholding the disclosure requirement,
the Court maintained that "all our discussions of restraints on commercial
speech have recommended disclosure requirements as one of
the acceptable
76
less restrictive alternatives to actual suppression of speech.
In Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, the Court addressed the
compelled funding of ideological activities associated with a public teacher's
union.7 7 Under Michigan's agency shop law, non-union teachers were required to pay "service fees" equal to union dues paid by members of the
union. 7' The non-union teachers objected, claiming these fees were being
used by the union to advance ideological, political activities to which they
objected and were not related to duties associated with the union's collective

71.
Id. at 629. Noting that commercial speech can be identified based on "the commonsense distinction between speech proposing a commercial transaction... and other varieties
of speech," the Court held that the speech in question in Zauderer was advertising pure and
simple and clearly fell within those bounds. Id. at 637 (citing Orhralik v. Ohio State Bar
Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447,455-56 (1978)).
72.
Id. at 651.
73.
Id. at 651 (internal citation omitted).
74.
Id. While extending First Amendment protection to certain commercial speech, the
Virginia Pharmacy Court observed that it might be "appropriate to require that a commercial
message appear in such a form, or include such additional information, warnings, and disclaimers, as are necessary to prevent its being deceptive." Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va.
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 772 n.24 (1976).
75.
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
76.
Id. (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S.

557, 565 (1980)).
77.
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209,211 (1977).
78.
Id. at 222. The Court explained that such agency shop arrangements are designed to
"distribute fairly the cost of [collective bargaining] activities among those who benefit, and it
counteracts the incentive that employees might otherwise have to become 'free riders'-to
refuse to contribute to the union while obtaining benefits of union representation that necessarily accrue to all employees." Id.
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bargaining agreement.79 Recognizing that being compelled to make such
contributions was no different than being prohibited from doing so, the
Court held that the union could constitutionally finance ideological activities
not germane to its collective bargaining duties only with funds paid by nonobjecting employees."0 The Court acknowledged that this germaneness
analysis could pose "difficult problems in drawing lines," between those
activities for which contributions may be compelled and those that are nongermane and for which compelled contributions are prohibited."'
Faced with the same line-drawing task in Keller v. State Bar of California, a case involving use of bar association funds to advance ideological
activities, the Court applied the Abood germaneness test by asking "whether
the challenged expenditures are necessarily or reasonably incurred" for the
purpose for which compelled association was justified.8 2 While recognizing
that determining "where the line falls" between germane and non-germane
activities may be difficult to discern, the Keller Court reversed the California
Supreme Court's rejection of Abood and remanded the case so that such a
line could be drawn."
From this line of compelled speech cases it appears clear that attempts to compel individuals to engage in ideological, non-commercial
speech must pass a strict scrutiny analysis. 84 Although compelling speech or
activities that are commercial in nature raises First Amendment issues of a
lower order and will be reviewed with more deference to legislative decisions, that deference is limited to the narrow state interest of safeguarding
against consumer deception.85 In many cases, courts will be called upon to
79.
Id. at 213. The complaint alleged that the union was engaged in "a number and variety of activities and programs which are economic, political, professional, scientific and religious in nature of which Plaintiffs do not approve, and in which they will have no voice, and
which are not and will not be collective bargaining activities ....

."

Id.

80.

Id. at 235-36.

81.
82.

Id.at 236.
Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1,14 (1990). In Abood, that purpose was repre-

sentation in the collective bargaining process. Abood, 431 U.S. at 211. In Keller, the purpose
was regulating the quality of legal services in California. Keller, 496 U.S. at 13 ("Here the
compelled association and integrated bar is justified by the State's interest in regulating the
legal profession and improving the quality of legal services.").
83.
Keller, 496 U.S. at 15. The Court disagreed with the California Supreme Court's
claim that application of Abood to case-by-case analysis of the bar association's activities
would represent "an extraordinary burden," agreeing instead with the dissent's assertion of
the contrary. Id. at 16. In light of the statutory regulation and oversight already exercised
over the bar association, the Court held that, in this context at least, the burden of meeting the
Abood requirement "is hardly sufficient to justify contravention of the constitutional mandate." Id. at 16-17 (citing Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 47 Cal. 3d 1152, 1192 (1989) (Kaufman, J., dissenting)).
84.
For a discussion of compelled speech in the ideological context, see supra notes 6770 and accompanying text.
85.
For a discussion of compelled speech in the commercial context, see supra notes 7176 and accompanying text.
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draw lines between activities that may be compelled (commercial) and those
which may not be compelled (ideological), and in so doing must ask whether
the complained of activity is germane to the principal interest and purpose of
the association.
3. The Supreme Court's First Amendment review of agricultural
checkoff programs
The Supreme Court has on two relatively recent occasions reviewed
First Amendment challenges to mandatory assessments under commodity
checkoff programs. In Glickman v. Wileman Brothers and Elliott, Inc., a
group of California tree fruit growers, handlers, and processors challenged
mandatory assessments levied upon them to fund generic advertising for
fruit from their state.86 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit had held that these assessments violated the First Amendment rights
of the handlers.8 7 Noting that the Ninth Circuit holding conflicted with a
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, the Supreme Court "granted the Secretary's petition for certiorari to resolve the
conflict." 8
The question presented to the Court was whether the assessments
violated the producers' freedom of speech, giving rise to a First Amendment
issue, or rather was "simply a question of economic policy for Congress and
the Executive to resolve." 9 The Court stressed the "statutory context" in
which that question was presented, which required an examination of the
extent to which individual marketing autonomy had already been sacrificed
in favor of the broader regulatory scheme represented by the marketing orders themselves.'
The majority opinion, written by Justice Stevens, began this contextual review by considering the extent to which the California tree fruit industry is regulated pursuant to marketing orders promulgated under the authority of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 (AMAA).9' The
86.
Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 460 (1997).
87.
Id. at 465. The District Court, reviewing the decision of the Judicial Officer of the
Department of Agriculture, upheld the orders and entered judgment on behalf of the government. Id. at 464. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit applied the Central Hudson test for commercial speech, holding that the assessments violated both the second prong (government failed
to prove that generic advertising directly advanced the state interest involved) and the third
prong (program was not narrowly tailored) of that analysis. Id. at 466.
88.
Id. at 466-67. The Third Circuit upheld the Act in United States v. Frame, 885 F.2d
1119 (3d Cir. 1989). For a discussion of Frame, see infra notes 146-50 and accompanying
text.
89.
Glickman, 521 U.S. at 468.
90.
Id. at 469.
91.
7 U.S.C. § 601-625 (1999 & Supp. 2003). Congress enacted the AMAA to establish
and maintain orderly marketing conditions and fair prices for agricultural commodities. Id. §
602(1).
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orders were characterized as a "species of economic regulation" that serve to
displace competition to such an extent that they are expressly exempted from
antitrust laws.92 Adoption of such orders requires the initial approval of
growers, and implementation is subsequently carried out by committees
comprised of regulated growers that are appointed by the Secretary of Agriculture.93 Additional regulatory guidelines and restraints constituted an industry that, by adopting the marketing orders, had embraced what the Court
deemed a "policy of collective, rather than competitive marketing."'94
Pursuant to this analysis, the Court upheld the assessments by finding that a First Amendment question did not even arise because the program
in question was "a species of economic regulation that should enjoy the
same strong presumption of validity that we accord to other policy judgments made by Congress." 5 In reaching this conclusion, the Court began by
distinguishing the regulatory scheme at issue from laws that have previously
been found to violate the First Amendment under a commercial speech
analysis." First, the tree fruit marketing orders "impose no restraint on the
freedom of any producer to communicate any message to any audience." g
Second, the orders "do not compel any person to engage in any actual or
symbolic speech." ' Finally, they "do not compel the producers to endorse
92.

Gliclkaan, 521 U.S. at 461. Furthermore, as the Court noted:
[T]hese orders may include mechanisms that provide a uniform price to
all producers in a particular market, that limit the quality and the quantity
of the commodity that may be marketed, that determine the grade and size
of the commodity, and that make an orderly disposition of any surplus
that might depress market prices.

Id. (internal citations omitted).
93.
Id. at 461-62.
94.
Id. at 46 1.
95.
Id. at 477.
96.
Id. at 469.
97.
Id. This distinguished Glickinan from the limits on commercial speech at issue in
Central Hudson, Virginia Pharmacy, and 44 Liquormart. Id. at 470 n. 12. The Court rejected
the growers' argument that the mandatory assessments functioned as a restriction in that they
reduced the amount of money available to conduct their own advertising. Id. at 470. Stating
that this argument is equally true for any other expense incurred in complying with a marketing order, the Court concluded:
The First Amendment has never been construed to require heightened
scrutiny of any financial burden that has the incidental effect of constraining the size of a firm's advertising budget. The fact that an economic
regulation may indirectly lead to a reduction in a handler's individual advertising budget does not itself amount to a restriction on speech.
Id.
98.
Id. at 469. This distinguished Glickman from the compelled speech in Barnette,
Wooley, Riley, and Hurley. Id. at 470 n. 13. The growers "are not required themselves to
speak, but are merely required to make contributions for advertising.... Furthermore, the
advertising is attributed not to them, but to the California Tree Fruit Agreement or 'California
Summer Fruits."' Id. at 471.
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or to finance any political or ideological views." Sweeping aside the specific objections of the producers by maintaining that it is "fair to presume"
that such producers in fact do agree with the generic advertising, the Court
determined that the scheme should be evaluated under a standard no different than that which would be "applicable to the other anticompetitive features" of the orders; that is, rational basis review."
After rejecting a Central Hudson analysis, the Court reviewed the
growers' claims under the compelled speech cases and found the doctrine
"clearly inapplicable to the regulatory scheme at issue here.''. The assessment scheme was distinguished from compelled speech case law because the
scheme compelled financial contributions, as opposed to speech itself. 2
With respect to such financial contributions, the Court maintained that
Abood did not set forth a First Amendment safeguard against compelled
financial support for programs or organizations advancing "expressive activities."'0 3 To the contrary, "Abood merely recognized a First Amendment
interest in not being compelled to contribute to an organization whose expressive activities conflict with one's 'freedom of belief."''' 3" That interest
can be abridged only if the compelled contributions used for political purposes that are unrelated to the principle purpose of the regulatory scheme
"interfere with the values lying at the 'heart of the First Amendment-the
notion that an individual should be free to believe as he will, and that in a
free society one's beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his conscience
rather than coerced by the state."" 5 Applying this standard to the tree fruit
assessments, the Court concluded that the required assessments "cannot be
said to engender any crisis of conscience. ' 6 As to the principal Abood requirement that assessments used for ideological purposes must be germane
to the legitimate governmental purpose, the Court held that test to be

99.
Id. at 469-70. This distinguished Glickmnan from cases such as Abood and Keller. Id.
at 470 n.14. The Court stated that none of the growers' objections "makes this case comparable to those in which an objection rested on political or ideological disagreement with the
content of the message. The mere fact that objectors believe their money is not being well
spent 'does not mean [that] they have a First Amendment complaint."' Id. at 472 (citing Ellis
v. Ry. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435,456 (1984)).
100.
Id. at 470.
101.
Id.
102.
Id. at 471. Use of the compelled assessments to pay for advertising did not "require
respondents to repeat an objectional [sic] message out of their own mouths, require them to
use their own property to convey an antagonistic ideological message, or require them to be
publicly identified or associated with another's message." Id. (internal citations omitted).
See PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980); Wooley v. Maynard, 430
U.S. 705, 713 (1977); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943).
103.
Glickman, 521 U.S. at 471.
104.
Id. (quoting Abood, 431 U.S. at 235).
105.
ld. at 472 (quoting Abood, 431 U.S. at 234-35).
106. Id.
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"clearly satisfied" as well." 7
Justice Souter's dissent began by reasserting two "basic principles of
First Amendment law: that speech as such is subject to some level of protection unless it falls within a category, such as obscenity, placing it beyond the
Amendment's scope; and that protected speech may not be made the subject
of coercion to speak or coercion to subsidize speech."' 8 He went on to fault
the Court's reading of Abood that a First Amendment issue does not arise "if
the speech is either germane to an otherwise permissible regulatory scheme
or is non-ideological.' ° Such a reading suggests, incorrectly in the dissent's
view, that "each of these characteristics constitutes an independent, sufficient criterion for upholding the subsidy."" 0 A correct application of Abood
would uphold a mandatory fee only if it if passes the germane test with respect to a "legitimate" regulatory scheme, is "justified by vital policy interests of the government," and achieves those interests without significantly
burdening free speech."'
The dissent maintained that CentralHudson was the appropriate legal standard, regardless of whether the issue was a law compelling speech or
restricting commercial speech." 2 Applying the test, the dissent found the
compelled assessment to fail on all three principal prongs."' In a separate
dissent, Justice Thomas criticized the use of Central Hudson, arguing
107. Id. at 473. The Court based this determination on its finding that "(1) the generic
advertising of California peaches and nectarines is unquestionably germane to the purposes of
the marketing orders and, (2) in any event, the assessments are not used to fund ideological
activities." Id.
108.
Id. at 478 (Souter, J., dissenting).
109.
Id. at 483 n.3 (Souter, J., dissenting).
110.
Id. (Souter, ., dissenting).
Ill.
Id. at 485 (Souter, J., dissenting).
112.
Id. at 491 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
113.
Id. at 492 (Souter, J.,
dissenting). The dissent stated the application of CentralHudson as a three-prong test, whereby "the law may be held constitutional only if (1) the interest
being pursued by the government is substantial, (2) the regulation directly advances that interest and (3) is narrowly tailored to serve it." Id. at 491 (Souter, J., dissenting). As for the
first prong, noting "the arbitrariness or underinclusiveness of the scheme chosen by the government may well suggest that the asserted interests either are not pressing or are not the real
objects animating the restriction on speech," the dissent argued that "the AMAA's authorization of compelled advertising programs is so random and so randomly implemented... as to
unsettle any inference that the Government's asserted interest is either substantial or even
real." Id. at 493-95 (Souter, J., dissenting). To pass the second prong, "the Government has
to show that its mandatory scheme appreciably increases the total amount of advertising for a
commodity or somehow does a better job of sparking the right level of consumer demand than
a wholly voluntary system would. There is no evidence of this in the record here." Id. at 501
(Souter, J.,
dissenting). Finally, observing that some marketing orders authorized under the
AMAA for other commodities provide for a credit to growers wishing to conduct their own
advertising, the dissent concluded "there could be no finding that a program completely denying credits for all individual advertising expenditures is narrowly tailored to an interest in the
stability or expansion of overall markets for a commodity." Id. at 503-04 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
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against the "discounted weight given to commercial speech generally," and
calling for a higher, strict scrutiny standard to be applied to all speech." 4
Justice Thomas was joined by Justice Scalia in Part H of his dissent, in
which they criticized "the majority's conclusion that coerced funding of advertising by others does not involve 'speech' at all and does not even raise a
First Amendment 'issue.""' 5 These dissenters argued that the majority opinion posed "one of two disturbing consequences":
Either (1) paying for advertising is not speech at all, while
such activities as draft card burning, flag burning, armband
wearing, public sleeping, and nude dancing are, or (2) compelling payment for third party communication does not implicate speech, and thus the Government would be free to
force payment for a whole variety of expressive conduct that
it could
not restrict. In either case, surely we have lost our
6
11

way.

Four years following Glickman, the Court again faced the question7
of compelled marketing assessments in United States v. United Foods."
This time the Court was asked to evaluate mandatory checkoff assessments
imposed on mushroom growers and handlers.""

114. Id. at 504 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Noting that "the regulation at issue here fails even
the more lenient Central Hudson test," it would also fail strict scrutiny, which "should be
applied to all speech, whether commercial or not." Id. (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
115. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). These dissenters went on to catalog cases in which the
Court held that "paying money for the purposes of advertising involves speech." Id. at 505
n. 1 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of
N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 568 (1980) (advertising to promote the use of electricity is speech); First
Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 767 (1978) (corporate advertising regarding
referendum); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 211 (1977) (payment of dues used
to engage in speech); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 7 (1976) (contributions for political advertising)). The dissent also noted cases in which the "Court also has recognized that compelling speech raises a First Amendment issue just as much as restricting speech." Id. at 505 n.2
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 185 (1997)
(coerced carriage of broadcast signals over cable television facilities); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v.
Pub. Util. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 4 (1986) (coerced inclusion of private messages in
utility bill envelopes); PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 76-77 (1980) (coerced creation of a speaker's forum on private property);.-bood, 431 U.S. 209, 211 (coerced
payment of dues used to engage in speech); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 706 (1977)
(coerced display of state license plate); Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241,
243 (1974) (coerced right of reply to newspaper editorials); W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 626 (1943) (coerced pledge of allegiance)).
116.
Glickman, 521 U.S. at 506 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
117.
United States v. United Foods, 533 U.S. 405, 408 (2001).
118. Id. The Mushroom Promotion, Research, and Consumer Information Act (the Mushroom Act) authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to establish a Mushroom Council comprised of mushroom producers and importers that would oversee the collection and administration of mandatory assessments used for mushroom industry promotion, research, con-
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Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy began by citing precedent
that First Amendment freedom of speech protection extends not only to
those whose speech is restricted, but also to those who are compelled to express certain views or "to pay subsidies for speech to which they object."" 9
Although commercial speech is afforded a lesser degree of protection, First
Amendment issues were still raised "because of the requirement that producers subsidize speech with which they disagree."'"2
Having found that a First Amendment issue did arise with respect to
the compelled mushroom assessments, the Court then engaged in a Glickman contextual analysis of the statutory scheme in order to distinguish its
holding from that in Glickman. 2' As opposed to the marketing order statute
in question in Glickman, which authorized expansive regulation of the tree
fruit industry in addition to mandatory marketing assessments, the statute at
issue in United Foods authorized only mandatory assessments to be used for
The mushroom industry operates under no marketing
generic advertising.'
orders regulating production and marketing, benefits from no antitrust protection, and the individual autonomy of individual growers is in no way curtailed.'23 Far from being ancillary to a broader regulatory scheme, the comsumer information, and industry information. Mushroom Promotion, Research, and Consumer Info. Act, 105 Stat. 3854, 7 U.S.C. § 6101-6112 (1999 & Supp. 2003).
119.
United Foods, 533 U.S. at 410. The Court cited Wooley and Barnette with respect to
compelled expression of certain views and Abood and Keller with respect to compelled subsidies for objectionable speech. Id. Note that these assertions, argued here by the majority,
directly embrace the principle concerns expressed by Justices Thomas and Scalia in their
Glicknan dissent, wherein they specifically criticized the Glicknan majority for holding that
(1) the advertising in that case was not speech at all and (2) that compelling payment for third
party communication does not implicate speech. See Glicknan, 521 U.S. at 504-06 (Thomas,
J., dissenting).
120.
United Foods, 533 U.S. at 411. The subsidies in question are authorized by §
6104(g)(2) of the Mushroom Act, which allows the Mushroom Council "to impose mandatory
assessments upon handlers of fresh mushrooms in an amount not to exceed one cent per
pound of mushrooms produced or imported." Id. at 408. As for the plaintiffs objections,
they claimed "that other mushroom producers shape the content of the advertising to its disadvantage and that the administrative process allows a majority of producers to create advertising to its detriment." United Foods, Inc. v. United States, 197 F.3d 221, 222 (6th Cir.
1999).
121.
United Foods,533 U.S. at 411. In UnitedFoods, the Court noted that the government
stressed the same factors used by the Glickman Court in determining there was no First
Amendment issue. Id. The assessment, the government argued, "imposes no restraint on the
freedom of an objecting party to communicate its own message; ... does not compel an objecting party. .. itself to express views it disfavors; and.., does not compel the expression of
political or ideological views." Id. The Court dismissed these points as being part of a "different type of regulatory scheme" that was not controlling. Id.
122.
Id. at 412. The Court noted that even the government did not contest that nearly all of
the funds collected under the mandatory mushroom assessments went to the sole purpose of
generic advertising. Id.
Id. The mushroom regulatory scheme included "no marketing orders that regulate
123.
how mushrooms may be produced and sold, no exemption from the antitrust laws, and nothing preventing individual producers from making their own marketing decisions." Id.
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pelled advertising "is the principal object of the regulatory scheme."'' 24 As
such, the Court found that "the mandated support is contrary to the First
Amendment principles set forth in cases involving expression by groups
which include persons who object to the speech, but' 25who, nevertheless, must
remain members of the group by law or necessity.'
At the outset, the Court noted that the government did not rely upon
Central Hudson in challenging the lower court's decision, and "we therefore
do not consider whether the Government's interest could be considered substantial for purposes of the Central Hudson test."'2 6 Instead, the Court
turned to Abood and began with an initial inquiry as to whether there existed
within the mushroom industry some state-imposed obligation that made
membership in the group being compelled to subsidize the speech "less than
voluntary."' 27 The involuntary union-shop arrangement in Abood was constitutionally justified in deference to the legislature's aim toward improving
labor relations and providing an effective means for collective bargaining.'
Mandatory participation in a state bar association in Keller was also upheld
as a means of achieving the legitimate goal of maintaining professional standards in the legal profession. 2 9 Similarly, the cooperative scheme in Glickman required individual producers to forego their autonomy in support of the
broader goal of maintaining a stable market. 30
Conversely, the Court found no such group action mandated under
the statutory scheme in United Foods, except that which is necessary to fund
This circumstance distinguished the case from Abood,
the speech itself.'
124. Id.
Id. at 413. The Court cited Abood and Keller as the principal cases setting forth these
125.
principles. Id.
Id. at 410. Noting that the CentralHudson test "has been subject to some criticism,"
126.
the Court maintained it could find "no basis under either Glickman or our other precedents to
sustain the compelled assessments sought in this case." Id. at 409-10. This seemed to cast
United Foods as a case of first impression in which "the question is whether the government
may underwrite and sponsor speech with a certain viewpoint using special subsidies exacted
from a designated class of persons, some of whom object to the idea being advanced." Id. at
410.
127.
Id. at 413. With respect to such group membership, the Court noted that "it is only
the overriding associational purpose which allows any compelled subsidy for speech in the
first place." Id.
128.
Id. at 414.
Id. In reviewing the validity of the mandatory association in Keller, the Court reiter129.
ated the central holding in that case that "objecting members were not required to give speech
subsidies for matters not germane to the larger regulatory purpose which justified the required
association." Id.
130. Id. The Court also noted, "Given that producers were bound together in the common
venture, the imposition upon their First Amendment rights caused by using compelled contributions for germane advertising was, as in Abood and Keller, in furtherance of an otherwise
legitimate program." Id. at 414-15.
131.
Id. at 415. ("[Tlhe statute does not require group action, save to generate the very
speech to which some handlers object.").
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Keller, and Glickman because it meant that there was no basis from which
the Court could evaluate whether the compelled speech was germane to a
legitimate governmental purpose. 2 As a result, the mushroom scheme
failed this threshold analysis because there was no underlying associational
purpose which might have justified the compelled speech assessments.'33
An inability to conduct a germaneness test did not prevent Abood from controlling, however, because the Court held that "the rationale of Abood extends to the party who objects to the compelled support for this speech."' 3 4
Furthermore, the Court maintained that its holding was consistent with the
Zauderer decision that upheld a disclosure requirement for advertisement of
legal services based on "the State's interest in 'preventing deception of consumers."""
The Court distinguished mandatory assessments for generic
advertising of mushrooms from permissible disclosure requirements because
"there is no suggestion in the case now before us that the mandatory assessments.., are somehow necessary to make voluntary advertisements nonmisleading for consumers."' 36
In a concurring opinion, Justice Stevens squared the Court's decision with that in Glickman by reiterating that First Amendment issues are
not raised if the compelled funding is "ancillary, or 'germane,' to a valid
cooperative endeavor."' 3 7 Conversely, the "naked imposition" of commercial speech whereby an individual is compelled to fund advertising that
benefits his competitors does raise such constitutional issues.'
Justice
Thomas, also concurring, remained consistent with his dissent in Glickman
by callirig for "the most stringent First Amendment scrutiny" for any regulation that compels the funding of advertising.' 39
Justice Breyer's dissent dismissed the manner in which the Court
distinguished the statutory scheme in question from that at question in
Glickman, arguing that the differences "could not have been critical."'"
132.
Id. ("Were it sufficient to say speech is germane to itself, the limits observed in
Abood and Keller would be empty of meaning and significance.").
133.
Id. ("[Tihe expression respondent is required to support is not germane to a purpose
related to an association independent from the speech itself.").
134.
Id. at 415-16.
135.
Id. at 416 (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court
of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)).
136.
Id.
137.
Id. at 418 (Stevens, J., concurring).
138.
Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
139.
Id. at 419 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas cited his dissent in Gliclnan,
wherein he stated his continued disagreement "with the use of the Central Hudson balancing
test and the discounted weight given to commercial speech generally." Glickman v. Wileman
Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 504 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
140.
UnitedFoods, 533 U.S. at 420 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer maintained that
the Court in Glickinan "did not refer to the presence of price or output regulations. It referred
to the fact that Congress had 'authorized' that kind of regulation." Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Noting that the same Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 that established market-
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Rather than focus on differences in the schemes that had actually been
promulgated and were presently being administered by the Secretary of Agriculture, the dissent noted that a broad regulatory scheme had in fact been
authorized in statute for both the tree fruit industry in Glickman and the
mushroom industry in United Foods. 4 Although the full arsenal of regulatory schemes that Congress had authorized for the mushroom industry had
not been implemented, it did not follow that such generic advertising was
not directly related to the underlying goal of "maintaining and expanding
The dissent found it "diffiexisting markets and uses for mushrooms."'"
cult" to understand how a less invasive form of regulation that relies only on
minimal mandatory advertising assessments could be invalidated while a
much more intrusive regulatory scheme that denies individual autonomy
could be upheld. 43 The dissent went on to characterize the regulatory
scheme in question not as speech but, as in Glickman, a "species of economic regulation."'" Even if the scheme were to be regarded as speech, the
dissent concluded that Central Hudson provided the appropriate test, under
which they would have found sufficient justification to uphold the scheme. 4 s
4. Lower court review of agricultural checkoff programs
In 1989, prior to both Gliclnan and United Foods, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld the Act as constitutional in
United States v. Frame.'6 In Frame, the government initiated an action
against the defendant livestock market operator and cattle producer for failure to collect and remit checkoff assessments. 47 The court began its First
Amendment analysis by rejecting the District Court's conclusion that "the
speech authorized and funded by the Act was 'government speech,"' and

ing orders and other means of regulatory intervention for the tree fruit industry in Glickman
also authorized the same kind of scheme for the mushroom industry, Justice Breyer found no
room to distinguish the regulatory schemes actually in place simply because the Secretary of
Agriculture had not exercised her discretion to promulgated such intervention in the mushroom industry. Id. at 420-21 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 420 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
141.
142.
Id. at 421 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Calling such collective promotion a "perfectly
traditional form of government intervention in the marketplace," the dissent clearly favored a
deferential, rational basis review of the statute. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
143.
Id. at 422 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 425 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Glickman, 521 U.S. at 477).
144.
145. Id. at 429 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Noting that the governmental interest is substantial,

the scheme both directly advances that interest (by solving the problem of "free riders" associated with voluntary promotional programs) and is not "disproportionately restrictive." Id. at
429-30 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

146. United States v. Frame, 885 F.2d 1119, 1122 (3d Cir. 1989).
147. Id. at 1124-25. As a producer, Frame was required under the Act to pay the assessment on each head of cattle he marketed as a producer. Id. at 1124. As a "collecting person"
under the Act, he was also required to collect and remit assessments to the relevant qualified
state beef council on all cattle sold through his auction market. Id.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol4/iss1/9

22

Fox: Constitutional Law - First Amendment Review of Beef Check-off Ass

2004

CASE NOTE

419

therefore exempt from First Amendment scrutiny. 48 Recognizing that First
Amendment rights were implicated, the court applied Central Hudson to
resolve the free speech claim. 49 In doing so, the court held that because "the
government's interest in preventing the collapse of a vital sector of the national economy qualifies as a compelling state interest, and that requiring
beef producers to contribute to the cost of commercial advertising intrudes
upon speech and association rights no more than necessary to achieve this
goal, we find that the Act serves, at the very least, a 'substantial' government
interest, and that the Act is 'carefully designed' to serve that goal.""'
After the Glickman decision and prior to United Foods, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit considered a First Amendment
challenge to the beef checkoff in Goetz v. Glickman. 5 ' In that case, the District Court followed the Third Circuit's decision in Frame, viewing the
speech in question as commercial speech and upholding the Act under a
Central Hudson analysis." 2 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the
Secretary that "the Act is 'government speech' (as opposed to commercial
speech) and there are no First Amendment restrictions on 'government
speech."" 53 Basing its decision on Glickman, the court construed that holding for the apparent proposition that there is no interference with speech

148. Id. at 1129. In its discussion of government speech, the Frame court observed that
"[c]itizens' tax dollars purchase a considerable amount of 'government speech,"' and when
the government speaks it "is engaging in expressive activities on behalf of everyone." Id. at
1131. Citing Abood, the court explained the rationale behind protecting government speech
from First Amendment scrutiny:
Compelled support of private association is fundamentally different from
compelled support of government. Clearly, a local school board does not
need to demonstrate a compelling state interest every time it spends a taxpayer's money in ways the taxpayer finds abhorrent. But the reason for
permitting the government to compel the payment of taxes and to spend
money on controversial projects is that the government is representative
of the people. The same cannot be said of a union, which is representative only of one segment of the population, with certain common interests. The withholding of financial support is fully protected as speech in
this context.
Id. (quoting Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 259 n.13 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring)).
149. Id. at 1133-34. Because the defendant also raised a free association claim, the court
incorporated the Supreme Court's decision in Roberts v. United States Jaycees in its Central

Hudson analysis to require that the state interest advanced by the interference be "unrelated to
the suppression of ideas." Id. at 1134 (citing Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609,
623 (1984)).
150. Id. at 1134 n. 12. The court held that the purpose underlying the Act "is ideologically
neutral." Id. at 1135.
151. Goetz v. Glickman, 149 F.3d 1131, 1134 (1Oth Cir. 1998).
152. Id. at 1134.
153. Id. at 1138.
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because advertising under the Act does not constitute compelled speech.'54
One year after Goetz, in Gallo Cattle Company v. CaliforniaMilk
Advisory Board, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
applied Glickman in a First Amendment challenge to mandatory assessments
collected under the authority of a California state milk marketing order.'
Holding that the order was "a species of economic regulation that does not
abridge [appellant's] First Amendment rights," the court upheld the order by
first construing Glickman to require an initial analysis of the statutory context of the order to determine whether the freedom of regulated producers to
act independently is already constrained by a broader regulatory scheme.'56
Finding that "California milk producers are regulated to the same extent as,
if not more than, the tree fruit growers" in Glickman, the court found that
"the first step in [Glickman] is therefore satisfied.' 57
The next step under Glickman, the court held, required consideration
of whether the assessments in question are a part of that extensive regulatory
scheme such that they are "subject to review only as an economic regulation," or if they instead act to abridge the appellant's First Amendment
rights. 5 ' The court held that, under Glickman, this analysis requires the
court to apply "a three-part test: (1) the marketing orders must not impose a
restraint on the freedom of any producer to communicate any message to any
audience; (2) the marketing orders must not compel any person to engage in
any actual or symbolic speech; and (3) the marketing orders must not compel
the producers to endorse or finance any political or ideological views that are
159
not 'germane' to the purpose for which compelled association is justified.'
Under the first prong, the court found that the marketing order did not impose a restraint on the appellant's freedom to communicate because he was
free to advertise any message to any audience he chooses."6 Applying the
second prong, the court found the appellant was not compelled to engage in
any actual or symbolic speech, because the retail display of a marketing seal
was voluntary under the provisions of the marketing order. 6 ' Finally, under
154. Although the Goetz court offered little in explanation, this reasoning is supported by
their interpretation of Gliclcnan. The court cited Glickman for the proposition that there is no
compelled speech when the assessments do "not require... producers to repeat objectionable
messages, use their property to convey antagonistic ideological messages, force them to respond to a hostile message when they prefer to remain silent or require them to be publicly
identified or associated with another's message." Id. at 1139.
Gallo Cattle Co. v. Cal. Milk Advisory Bd., 185 F.3d 969, 974-77 (9th Cir. 1999).
155.
156. Id. at 977. The court began its analysis by stating "[tlhe first step in [Glickman] is an
examination of the statutory scheme under which the assessments are made." Id. at 974.
157.
Id. at 974-75.
158.
Id. at 975.
Id. at 973.
159.
160. Id. at 975. The court noted that this distinguished Gallo from the limits on commercial speech at issue in 44 Liquormart, Central Hudson, and Virginia Pharmacy. Id. n.6.
161.
Id. at 976. The court noted that the voluntary nature of this aspect of the program
distinguished Gallo from the compelled speech in Riley, Wooley, and Barnette. Id. n.7.
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the third prong, the court held that the advertising programs funded by the
assessments were "'germane' to the purposes and goals of the Marketing Act
and the Marketing Order."' 62 In reaching this conclusion, the court did not
analyze whether the appellant's objections were indeed based on ideological
grounds, finding it sufficient that the "advertising campaign is 'germane' to
the purposes for which the compelled association is justified."'6 3
That same year, in Cal-Almond, Inc. v. United States Department of
Agriculture, the Ninth Circuit applied the same analysis in upholding mandatory assessments levied upon almond handlers pursuant to an almond
marketing order.' Applying the same analysis as in Gallo, the court initially found that almond handlers were subject to a broad regulatory
scheme.' 65 Moving to the subsequent "tripartite" Glickman test, the court
held that under the program the handlers were neither restricted in their ability to communicate nor compelled to engage in any actual or symbolic
assessments "germane to the purposes
speech." Finally, the court found the
167
of the Almond Order and the Act.'
After the United Foods decision, the United States District Court for
the District of Montana upheld the beef checkoff as constitutional in Charter
v. United States Department ofAgriculture.68 Noting how the existence of a
broader regulatory scheme distinguished the United States Supreme Court's
decisions in Glickman and United Foods, the court initially held that "the
beef checkoff program is not germane to a larger regulatory scheme, and it is
subject to First Amendment constraints."' 169 Because the entities set up under
the Act to administer the checkoff "are groups of private speakers the government utilizes to transmit a specific government message," the court held
that "the beef checkoff funded advertising is attributable to Congress and the
162.
Id. at 976.
163.
Id. Basing this analysis on Abood, the court was consistent with the majority holding
in Glicknan that interpreted Abood as an "either-or" test, whereby such compelled assessments may be upheld if they are either germane to the purpose for which compelled association was justified, or are otherwise non-ideological. For further discussion on the "either-or"
test, see supra notes 109-11.
164.
Cal-Almond, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Agric., 192 F.3d 1272, 1274 (9th Cir.
1999). The almond marketing order was issued by the U.S. Department of Agriculture under
the authority of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, 7 U.S.C. § 601 (as
amended) (1999 & Supp. 2003). Id. at 1273.
165.
Id. at 1274-75.
Id. at 1274-76.
166.
167.
Id. at 1276. While the "germaneness" analysis satisfied the Abood test set forth by
the third prong, the court went on to note in dicta that Abood was separately satisfied because
the messages in question were non-ideological, in that they did not "engender any crisis of
conscience." Id. (citing Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 472

(1997)).
168. Charter v. United States Dep't of Agric., 230 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1142 (D. Mont.
2002).
169.
Id. at 1129.
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USDA."' 7 ° As such, the checkoff is "non-ideological, content-oriented government speech which does not violate free speech or free association.''.
In Michigan Pork Producers Association, Inc. v. Veneman, a case
decided after Livestock Marketing Association, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed a lower court ruling that the pork
checkoff "violates the First Amendment rights of pork producers by compelling them to subsidize speech with which they do not agree."' 7 2 Rejecting
the government's argument that the checkoff constituted government speech
and was therefore exempt from First Amendment scrutiny, the court held
that the Pork Act "is nearly identical in purpose, structure, and implementation to the Mushroom Act," and therefore "unconstitutional under the analysis set forth in United Foods."'7 Although the plaintiff pork producers attempted to distinguish the Mushroom Act from the Pork Act, arguing that
only a small portion of the funds collected under the latter were used for
generic advertising, the court found that in fact a majority of funds collected
under the Pork Act were devoted to "Demand Enhancement."' 74 Moreover,
the court noted that the District Court "found that Pork Act programs providing for 'education' and 'research' were designed to further the Act's promotional goals."' 75 The court found the use of assessments to fund advertising
under the Pork Act was prohibited by the First Amendment because such
compelled expression "is not germane
to a purpose related to an association
76
independent from the speech itself.'
PRINCIPAL CASE

Appellee Livestock Marketing Association ("Livestock Marketing"),
a trade association representing livestock markets, initiated a petition drive
in 1998 to require the Secretary of Agriculture to conduct a nationwide pro170.
171.

Id. at 1140.
Id. at 1141.

172. Michigan Pork Producers Ass'n, Inc. v. Veneman, 348 F.3d 157, 159 (6th Cir. 2003).
The pork checkoff is authorized by the Pork Promotion, Research, and Consumer Information
Act, 7 U.S.C. § 4801 (2003). See Michigan Pork Producers at 159-60.

173. Id. at 162-63.
174. Id. at 163. The court observed that the 2001 budget for programs operated under the
Pork Act "called for $29,388,491, or 51 percent of the total expenses, to be used under the
category of 'Demand Enhancement."' Id. Program categories associated with demand enhancement activities included Advertising, Merchandising, Foodservice, Pork Information

Bureau, and Foreign Market Development/World Trade. Id.
175. Id. While the District Court indicated that checkoff opponents objected to funding of
education and research activities under the Pork Act, the District Court did not expressly
equate such activities to furthering the promotional goals of the checkoff program. Michigan
Pork Producers Ass'n v. Campaign for Family Farms, 229 F. Supp. 2d 772, 776-77 (W.D.

Mich. 2002). Instead, the District Court merely noted that such objections, though "not always consistent nor persuasive," were nevertheless "sincere and strongly-held views" maintained by program opponents. Id. at 777.
176. Michigan PorkProducers,348 F.3d at 163 (citation omitted).
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ducer referendum on the continuation of the beef checkoff.'77 After the Secretary failed to act in certifying the submitted petitions and scheduling a
vote, Livestock Marketing brought suit in the United States District Court
for the District of South Dakota seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief'
The District Court granted injunctive relief in February, 2001,
restricting the Secretary from using any checkoff funds to finance any policy
or producer communications
activities designed to enhance or support
79
checkoff-related activities.1

After the United States Supreme Court held that similar assessments
violated the First Amendment rights of mushroom growers in United Foods,
appellees were granted leave to amend their complaint to include a claim
that the generic advertising funded and conducted under the Act violated
their First Amendment rights of freedom of speech and freedom of association. 80 Appellees objected to the assessments because they believed that
such generic advertising promoted the consumption of foreign beef as well
as domestically produced beef.'
The Secretary responded by arguing that promotional activities conducted under the Act constitute government speech and are therefore exempt
from First Amendment scrutiny. 2 In rejecting that defense and following
the Supreme Court's decision in United Foods, the District Court held that
"[t]he beef checkoff is unconstitutional in violation of the First Amendment
because it requires plaintiffs to pay, in part, for speech to which the plaintiffs
object.' 13 Like the Glicknan Court, the District Court refused to apply a
Central Hudson analysis since Central Hudson was in fact a case involving
"a restriction on commercial speech rather than the compelled funding of
speech ... ."' Instead, the District Court focused on a Glickman analysis
of the statutory context in which the compelled assessments operate. 8 5
Based on this contextual review, the court found that "[t]he beef checkoff is,
in all material respects, identical to the mushroom checkoff' reviewed in
United Foods. 6 As such, the court held that United Foods was controlling,
177. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n v. United States Dep't of Agric., 335 F.3d 711, 714 (8th Cir.
2003).
178. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n v. United States Dep't of Agric., 132 F. Supp. 2d 817 (D.S.D.
2001).
179. Id. at 832.
180. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n v. United States Dep't of Agric., 207 F. Supp. 2d 992, 996
(D.S.D. 2002). After the filing of the amended complaint, the District Court denied parties
cross-motions for partial summary judgment on the First Amendment claim. Id.
181. Id. at 997.
182. Id. at 1003.
183. Id. at 1002.
184. Id. at 999.
185. Id. at 1000. The District Court noted that the existence of a broad regulatory regime
"was dispositive of the outcome in Glicionan. Thus, the extent of the regulatory scheme in
connection with the beef checkoff must be largely dispositive in this case." Id.
186. Id. at 1002.
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and because "the principal object of the beef checkoff program is the commercial speech itself," the assessments failed First Amendment scrutiny under the "germaneness" standard grounded in Abood and its progeny.' 7
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit upheld the District Court "holding that
the Beef Act and the Beef Order are unconstitutional and unenforceable."'' 8
However, the panel disagreed with the District Court's rejection of a Central
Hudson analysis because their reasoning "fail[ed] to account for the more
recent pronouncements in United Foods."'' 9 After observing how the United
Foods Court distinguished the narrow regulatory objectives of the Mushroom Act from the broad regulatory scheme for California tree fruits under
review in Glickman, the court flatly stated that "Gliclanan does not provide a
complete answer to this commercial speech issue."" Instead, as the court
noted:
We infer that, had the government relied upon CentralHudson in United Foods, the Supreme Court would have
adapted the CentralHudson test to the circumstances of that
case ....We reach this conclusion recognizing that Central
Hudson involved a restriction on speech while the present
case involves compelled speech. In our view, it is more significant that Central Hudson and the case at bar both involve government interference with private speech in a
commercial context.' 9'
,The court thus adapted the CentralHudson test to the present case,
finding the first prong satisfied because the appellees had a protected First
Amendment interest at stake.' 92 The next three prongs of the analysis were
recast in what the court regarded as a more succinct manner: "[W]hether the
governmental interest in the commercial advertising under the Beef Act is
sufficiently substantial to justify the infringement upon appellee's First
187.
Id.
188.
Livestock Mktg. Ass'n v. United States Dep't of Agric., 335 F.3d 711, 726 (8th Cir.
2003).
189.
Id. at 722.
190.
Id.
191.
Id. In United Foods, the Court observed that "the Government itself does not rely
upon Central Hudson to challenge the Court of Appeal's decision, and we therefore do not
consider whether the Government's interest could be considered substantial for purposes of
the CentralHudson test." United States v. United Foods, 533 U.S. 405, 410 (2001) (internal
citations omitted).
192.
Livestock Mtg. Ass'n, 335 F.3d at 723. Without further explanation, the court stated
that "under the compelled speech line of cases, appellees have a protected First Amendment
interest at stake." Id. The court apparently reached this conclusion earlier in its opinion when
it noted Justice Stevens' statement in United Foods that "cases such as Keller, Abood, and the
case at bar-involving compelled payment of money--may be viewed as the 'compelled
subsidy' subset of the compelled speech cases." Id. at 721 (quoting United Foods, 533 U.S.
at 417-18 (Stevens, J., concurring)).
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Amendment
right not to be compelled to subsidize that commercial
193
speech."'

The court maintained that the answer to this question "turns largely
upon the nature of the speech in question."' 94 To make that determination,
the court turned to the Supreme Court's rulings in Abood and Keller, where
it was necessary to determine whether the speech at issue "was germane to
the institutional purposes which justified the mandatory dues in the first
place."' 9 5 Although making such a determination often involves difficult
line-drawing, the court found that the "relevant line" had already been drawn
for the present case by the Supreme Court in United Foods.'" There, the
Court had noted that a statute authorizing no broader regulatory scheme than
that compelling the speech itself could not be upheld.1 97 Without a broader
scheme, the program in United Foods in essence collapsed of its own
weight, since "[w]ere it sufficient to say speech is germane to itself, the limits observed in Abood and Keller would be empty of meaning and significance."'
Based on this reasoning from the compelled speech line of cases,
the court concluded its Central Hudson analysis by holding that "the government's interest in protecting the welfare of the beef industry by compelling all beef producers and importers to pay for generic beef advertising is
not sufficiently substantial to justify the infringement on appellee's First
Amendment free speech right."199
ANALYSIS
Two aspects of the Eighth Circuit's analysis in Livestock Marketing
leap out as seemingly inconsistent with established Supreme Court precedent
in the context of First Amendment review of commodity checkoff programs.
The first is the court's refusal to simply follow the decision in United Foods,
a case that is nearly identical in terms of its facts and the statutory context of
the contested program. 2" Second, the court's decision to adapt a modified
version of the Central Hudson test stands in stark contrast to the Supreme
Court's express refusal to apply that test in either Glickman or United
193.
Id. at 723.
194. Id. at 723-24.
195. Id. at 724.
196. Id. at 725.
197. Id. "We have not upheld compelled subsidies for speech in the context of a program
where the principal object is speech itself." Id. (citing United Foods, 533 U.S. at 415-46
(internal citation omitted)).
198. Id. at 725 (citing United Foods, 533 U.S. at 415-16 (internal citation omitted)).
199. Id. at 725-26.
200. The District Court noted that "the beef checkoff is, in all material respects, identical
to the mushroom checkoff," "the principal object of the beef checkoff program is the commercial speech itself," and "the assessments are not germane to a larger regulatory purpose."
Livestock Mktg. Ass'n v. United States Dep't of Agric., 207 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1002 (D.S.D.
2002). As such, "[t]his case is therefore controlled by United Foods and not by Gliclnan."
Id.
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Foods.20
Of course, neither of these observations stands for the proposition
that the Eight Circuit got it wrong, because there is ample evidence that the
Supreme Court itself is still searching for the correct approach in this emergent area of First Amendment jurisprudence. 0 2 In effect, however, the
Eighth Circuit's reasoning does unfortunately roil these already muddy waters, and evinces the need for a more rational analytical framework. 2 3 A
more appropriate framework requires a departure from the limited on-point
Supreme Court precedent represented by Glickman and UnitedFoods, and a
return to those standards that undergird the historical protection afforded
commercial speech under the First Amendment.
Livestock Marketing traces a torturedpath through the commercialspeech
doctrine
Even Supreme Court Justices can differ and do continue to differ as
to the appropriate level of deference to be afforded legislative acts that either
restrict or compel commercial speech. 2'" The Glickman decision, in particular, constituted "a significant departure from traditional commercial speech
and compelled speech analysis. 2 5 While the Eighth Circuit made a valiant

201.
In Gliclnan, the majority observed that the criticism of the generic advertising in
question provided "no basis for concluding that factually accurate advertising constitutes an
abridgment of anybody's right to speak freely," and so it was "error for the Court of Appeals
to rely on Central Hudson for the purpose of testing the constitutionality of market order
assessments for promotional advertising." Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521
U.S. 457, 474 (1997). At least implicitly, the majority drew a line of distinction as to where
Central Hudson would be an appropriate analysis by noting that "[tihe Court of Appeals fails
to explain why the Central Hudson test, which involved a restriction on commercial speech,
should govern a case involving the compelled funding of speech." Id. n. 18.
202.
As Justice Souter pointed out in his dissent in Gliclanan, that case represented "the
first commercial-speech subsidy case to come before us." Id. at 488 (Souter, J., dissenting).
203.
Preview of United States Supreme Court Cases, 2000-2001 Term, 8 A.B.A. J. 418
(2001) (observing the wide differences of approach employed by the Justices of the Supreme
Court in United Foods and noting that in any decision invoking a Central Hudson analysis it
seems "the Justices appear destined to choose up sides based on those four factors on a caseby-case basis.").
204.
See, e.g., Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L.
REv. 1 (2000). Professor Post characterized the commercial speech doctrine as "a notoriously
unstable and contentious domain of First Amendment jurisprudence. No other realm of First
Amendment law has proved as divisive." Id. at 2.
205.
Casarez, supra note 58, at 960. Professor Casarez continued:
The majority's contextual approach resulted in a house-of-cards opinion
based on a faulty premise: that compelled commercial speech does not
raise a First Amendment issue because its speakers do not suffer a 'crisis
of conscience.' This premise overlooks three settled First Amendment
principles: first, that compelled speech is just as constitutionally suspect
as restricted speech; second, that paying for speech is constitutionally
equivalent to speaking; and third, that commercial speech falls within the
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attempt to discern a path within the constraints of Glickman and United
Foods, its analysis suffers by the inappropriate application of precedential
tools that are themselves improper in the present context.
The Eighth Circuit principally invoked Glickman, United Foods, and
Central Hudson.2" The manner in which the court alternatively distinguished and relied on these precedents in deciding the principal case provides instruction as to their inadequacy with respect to First Amendment
review of compelled subsidies for commercial speech. The line of reasoning
adopted by the Eighth Circuit to justify its use of Central Hudson is, at best,
difficult to follow. The court began by noting that the District Court had
declined the use of Central Hudson because the Supreme Court also declined its use in Glickman. 7 This conclusion, according to the Eighth Circuit, was erroneous because it ignored the more recent pronouncements in
United Foods. 20 There, the Supreme Court had made a special effort to
distinguish the unregulated nature of the mushroom industry at issue in that
case from the highly regulated marketing order scheme at issue in Glickman.2 ' 9 Having distinguished Glickman, the Eighth Circuit felt free to "infer" that-here comes the leap-the Supreme Court would indeed have applied CentralHudson in United Foods if only the government had relied on
that test in their brief. ° The court justified this inference based on the passage in United Foods in which the Supreme Court stated that it need not
engage in an analysis of the substantiality of the government's interest because the government was not arguing on the basis of Central Hudson."'
Aligning itself with United Foods by noting that the beef checkoff is materially identical to the mushroom checkoff, the Eighth Circuit announced that it
would "now adapt the CentralHudson test" that had just been read into the
United Foods decision. 12
The test adapted, however, bore little resemblance to Central Hudson.213 After setting out the four prongs, the Eighth Circuit took the liberty
of "more succinctly" restating the test: "[T]he issue is whether the governmental interest in the commercial advertising under the Beef Act is suffiscope of the First Amendment. It is obvious that the Court ignored these

principles[.]
Id.
206. For a discussion of the Eighth Circuit decision, see supra notes 177-99 and accompanying text.
207. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n v. United States Dep't of Agric., 335 F.3d 711, 722 (8th Cir.
2003).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. For the four-prong test outlined in Central Hudson, see supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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ciently substantial to justify the infringement upon appellee's First Amend21 4
ment right not to be compelled to subsidize that commercial speech.
While the second-prong "substantial governmental interest" inquiry made it
into the succinct version, the third-prong requirement that the program "directly advance" the government interest had disappeared.2" 5 The court's
succinct version of CentralHudson also dropped the fourth-prong requirement that the program be "no more extensive than necessary" to advance the
government interest.21 6 As such, this "more succinct" test bore no resemblance to CentralHudson.
Having reformulated the CentralHudson test into a one-prong "sufficiently substantial" analysis of the governmental interest being advanced,
the court stated that this inquiry "turns largely upon the nature of the speech
in question., 217 The nature of the speech can be analyzed differently in different contexts, either in terms of its "germaneness" to an underlying associational purpose, its "viewpoint neutrality" with respect to the speech that is
financed, or some other benchmark.2 " Each of these tests, the court observed, involves a "difficult line-drawing exercise" used to determine
whether the infringement on speech in question is permissible. 2 9 The court
found that the "relevant line" had already been drawn for them by the Supreme Court in the United Foods decision:
We have not upheld compelled subsidies for speech in the
214.
Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 335 F.3d at 723. The court found the first prong of Central
Hudson satisfied by holding that "appellees have a protected First Amendment interest at
stake." Id. The remaining three prongs were traditionally stated as "whether the governmental interest in the beef checkoff program is substantial and, if so, whether the beef checkoff
program directly advances that governmental interest and is not more extensive than necessary to serve that interest." Id.
215.
Although the court identified the third prong of Central Hudson as an inquiry into
"whether the beef checkoff program directly advances" a substantial governmental interest,
its reformulated version asks only whether the governmental interest is "sufficiently substantial to justify the infringement upon appellee's First Amendment right." Id.
216.
Although the court identified the fourth prong of Central Hudson as an inquiry into
whether the beef checkoff program "is not more extensive than necessary to serve" a substantial governmental interest, its reformulated version asks only whether the governmental interest is "sufficiently substantial to justify the infringement upon appellee's First Amendment
right." Id.
Id. at 723-24.
217.
218.
Id. at 724. The germaneness analysis was of course the standard set forth in Abood
and Keller, cases in which the Supreme Court "considered the nature of the speech at issue in
terns of whether or not it was germane to the institutional purposes which justified the mandatory dues in the first place." Id. Properly, the Eighth Circuit in the present case recognized
that a germaneness analysis would not apply in every context. Id. (citing Bd. of Regents v.
Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 232-35 (2000)). A "viewpoint neutrality" analysis was adopted in
Southworth, wherein the Supreme Court held that because the germaneness analysis was
unmanageable in the context of challenges to compelled student activity fees at a state university, the proper standard in that context was to require viewpoint neutrality in allocating those
fees to fund various campus organizations. Southworth, 529 U.S. at 233.
219.
Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 335 F.3d at 724.
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context of a program where the principal object is speech itself.... [T]he expression respondent is required to support
is not germane to a purpose related to an association independent from the speech itself; and the rationale of Abood
extends to the party who objects to the compelled support
for this speech.22 °
Thus, the court concluded that, in the context of the beef checkoff
program, the government's interest was "not sufficiently substantial to jus22
tify the infringement on appellee's First Amendment free speech right. '1
While the court did not expand further in either identifying or analyzing the
purported governmental interest, it appears that the court found as dispositive the apparent lack of a more comprehensive regulatory scheme against
which the compelled speech could be analyzed under an Abood germaneness
test.
Based on the court's reasoning, criticism of the Eighth Circuit decision in Livestock Marketing can therefore be summarized along lines associated with the three Supreme Court precedents outlined earlier. First, the
court improperly inferred the applicability of CentralHudson, and in its subsequent reformulation of that test performed an analysis that in essence ignored all but the initial, threshold prong. Second, while properly distinguishing Glickman, the court nevertheless invoked that case as a basis from
which to distinguish the beef checkoff much as the Supreme Court distinguished the mushroom checkoff in United Foods. 2 By doing so, the court
found a First Amendment issue based solely upon its analysis of the extent
of the regulatory scheme at issue, rather than by examining the nature of the
speech itself in order to determine whether the First Amendment was invoked. 3 Finally, although the court properly invoked United Foods and its
extension of Abood to a commercial context, the court merely rubberstamped the United Foods analysis of the Mushroom Act without a further
factual inquiry into the regulatory scheme implemented under the authority

220. Id. at 725 (citing United Foods, 533 U.S. at 415-16).
221.
Id. at 726.
222.
See generally Paul M. Schoenhard, The End of Compelled Contributions for Subsidized Advertising?, 25 HARv.J.L. & PUB.POL. 1185, 1199 (2002) ("United Foods identifies a
First Amendment boundary between compelled contributions for advertising under a regulatory scheme aimed exclusively at such advertising and similar contributions under more expansive regulatory programs.").
223.
This limited inquiry, while consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in United
Foods, also sidestepped any consideration of the First Amendment validity of other programs
authorized, funded, and carried out under the Act. See William Conner Eldridge, Note,
United We Stand, Divided We Fall-Arguing the Constitutionality of Commodity Checkoff
Programs, 56 ARK.L. REv. 147, 175 (2003) ("United Foods may be read to permit the constitutionality of checkoff programs that spend significant amounts of money on non-promotional
activities and that involve highly regulated commodities.").
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2 24
of the Beef Act.

The Eighth Circuitanalysisapplies inadequatestandardsto the present context
A review of the three principal standards outlined above reveals that
each suffers limitations when applied to the context of compelled subsidies
for commercial speech. When Central Hudson was first enunciated by the
Supreme Court in striking down a state-imposed restriction on commercial
speech, it was regarded as an intermediate level of scrutiny requiring that the
state "assert a substantial interest" and that the restriction "directly advance"
that interest."
In its subsequent application, however, Central Hudson
could aptly be described as the commercial speech analogue to Justice Stewart's famous phrase characterizing his own"226
flexible test for identifying that
it. ,
see
I
when
it
know
"I
obscene:
is
which
In particular, the 1986 Posadas decision represented something
other than intermediate scrutiny, and has been characterized as the "low water mark" for protection of commercial speech under CentralHudson analysis. 227 The "extremely deferential" application of the fourth prong of Central
Hudson by the PosadasCourt marked a clear retreat from the level of scrutiny that had initially been envisioned.228 The Court expressly restated this
lower rational basis standard in Fox, holding that the fit between the legislature's ends and its chosen means of achieving those ends must be "not necessarily perfect, but reasonable." 229
Protection for commercial speech under Central Hudson has enjoyed a revival of sorts, but in an unpredictable manner. In the 1993 Discovery Network decision, the Court strictly applied the third prong and held that
there was not a reasonable fit between the restriction employed and the ex224.

See Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 335 F.3d at 722 ("[Tlhe beef checkoff program at issue in

the present case is identical in all material respects to the mushroom checkoff program at
issue in United Foods ....
").

225. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557,
564 (1980). For characterization of the test in Central Hudson, at least initially, as constituting intermediate scrutiny, see Edward J. Schoen et al., Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott:
California Fruit Marketing Orders Prune the First Amendment, 10 WIDENER J. PuB. L. 21, 39
(2000) ("Central Hudson .. .formalized the ... intermediate-level protection accorded to

commercial speech'); Casarez, supra note 54, at 947 ("Central Hudson reduced the First
Amendment protection granted to truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech to an intermediate level.").
226. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
227.
P. Cameron DeVore, The Two Faces of Commercial Speech under the First Amendment, 12 COMm. LAW. 1, 23 (1994). For a discussion of Posadas, see supra note 59.

228. See Schoen et al., supra note 225, at 44. ("Under Posadas, infringements on commercial speech can pass constitutional muster so long as they are camouflaged with express
statements of government policy.").
229. Bd. of Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989).
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pressed state interest.230 Three terms later, Justice Stevens went much further in enhancing commercial speech protection in his 44 Liquormart plurality opinion, arguing for an intermediate standard of review under Central
Hudson for speech restrictions designed to protect consumers, and for strict
scrutiny of those measures that restrict truthful, nonmisleading commercial
speech."' Because 44 Liquormartwas decided by a plurality, however, it is
questionable as to whether the Court in any subsequent case will follow Justice Stevens in affording this higher level of protection to commercial
speech, or fall back instead to a more deferential standard of review.232
In spite of the trend toward more vigorous review of commercial
speech restrictions under the CentralHudson test, this standard remains subject to the vicissitudes of the Court. Because CentralHudson has been used
to apply rational basis review to government actions infringing First
Amendment rights to freedom of speech, it is imperative to look to alternative tests that employ a higher level of scrutiny in determining the constitutionality of such actions.
The reasoning advanced in Glickman surely fails to provide such a
standard. 3 Importantly, the Eighth Circuit recognized that Glickman was
230. For a discussion of Discovery Network, see supra note 59. While the holding represents greater protection for commercial speech when compared to either Posadas or Fox, it
still employs the "reasonable" language associated with rational basis review.
231. For a discussion of 44 Liquormart, see supranotes 60-66 and accompanying text.
231. Justice Stevens was joined for most of his plurality opinion by Justices Kennedy,
Ginsburg, and Souter. Importantly, Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg joined in arguing for
intermediate scrutiny for restrictions designed to protect consumers and strict scrutiny for
measures restricting truthful, nonmisleading speech. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island,
517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996) (Stevens, J., plurality opinion). Justice Thomas concurred in the
judgment, but advocated against CentralHudson and in favor of strict scrutiny, maintaining
that "I do not see a philosophical or historical basis for asserting that 'commercial' speech is
of 'lower value' than 'noncommercial' speech." Id. at 522 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice
Scalia also concurred in the judgment, and although he was noncommittal as to the proper
standard to apply, he admitted that he did "share Justice Thomas' discomfort with the Central
Hudson test." Id. at 517 (Scalia, J., concurring). Taken together, these opinions do seem to
point to something more than a five-Justice majority that is willing to invoke a higher level of
scrutiny when reviewing commercial speech restrictions. See also Casarez, supra note 54, at
.945. Here the author noted:
[T]he case practically guarantees that restrictions on truthful, nonmisleading commercial information about lawful commodities are invalid, regardless of whether the Central Hudson test is used or not. Whether the
Court applies strict scrutiny in such situations (Justice Stevens' approach), invalidates the restriction based on anti-paternalism (Justice
Thomas' choice), or applies a stricter version of Central Hudson's third
and fourth prongs (Justice O'Connor's preference), the result should be
the same.
Id.
233.
See, e.g., Jennifer R. Franklin, Peaches, Speech, and Clarence Thomas: Yes, California, There is a Justice Who Understands the Ramifications of Controlling Commercial
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not controlling in the principal case, albeit for reasons not associated with its
dubious holding that commercial speech is not speech at all if compelled in
concert with an ancillary and broader regulatory scheme.234 While the court
certainly did not need to reach this flawed premise underlying Glickman, its
decision in Livestock Marketing did implicitly endorse Glickman. The court
did so by finding that the narrow purpose and function of the Beef Act and
the apparent lack of a broader regulatory scheme-rather than the presence
of legitimate First Amendment interests-necessarily took the challenge to
the beef checkoff out of Glickman's shadow.23
In Glickman, the majority simply reviewed its earlier First Amendment cases, found nothing on point, and declared that speech was not even at
issue.236 Seemingly bound and determined to apply rational basis review and
uphold the assessments from the outset, the Glickman court did so by first
distinguishing three characteristics of the regulatory scheme at issue from
laws that have been found to violate the First Amendment. 7
The Glickman majority observed that the marketing orders: (1) impose no restraint on the freedom of any producer to communicate any message to any audience; (2) do not compel any person to engage in any actual
or symbolic speech; and (3) do not compel the producers to endorse or to
finance any political or ideological views." s Boldly assuming that the respondent tree fruit producers actually agree with "the central message of the
Speech, 12 REGENT U.L. REv. 627, 647 (2000) ("To stop short of recognizing the speech
implicated in [Gliclknan]is to deny the protection afforded by the First Amendment.").
234.
The Eighth Circuit distinguished Gliclnan for the same reasons as the Supreme
Court did in United Foods; specifically, "the collective advertising was the 'principal object'
of the Mushroom Act, whereas the collective advertising in Glickman was just one among
many of the 'anticompetitive features of the [California tree fruit] marketing orders."' Livestock Mktg. Ass'n v. United States Dep't of Agric., 335 F.3d 711, 722 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing
Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 470 (1997)). The Eighth Circuit
further noted, "Accordingly, we conclude that Gliclnan does not provide a complete answer
to this commercial speech issue." Id.
235.
Of course, as long as the Gliciknan and United Foods paradigm is allowed to stand,
uncertainty will weigh on those industries that have established "free-standing" checkoff
programs such as the Beef Act. Whether such programs actions are held to violate the First
Amendment under either United Foods or reasoning similar to that employed by the Eighth
Circuit, one remedial measure that could be employed to revive the programs would appear to
be imposition of regulatory measures that further limit the independence of individual producers. Indeed, this was the very irony underscored by Justice Breyer in his United Foods
dissent: "It is difficult to see why a Constitution that seeks to protect individual freedom
would consider the absence of 'heavy regulation' to amount to a special, determinative reason
for refusing to permit this less intrusive progran." United States v. United Foods, 533 U.S.
405, 422 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted).
236.
For a discussion of Glicknan, see supra notes 86-116 and accompanying text.
237.
At least one commentator has observed that "[p]rescient readers could glean the
Court's conclusion from the second paragraph of the opinion, where Justice Stevens characterized the marketing orders as 'a species of economic regulation .
Casarez, supra note
54, at 955-56.
238.
Glickman, 521 U.S. at 469-70.
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speech" that they were nonetheless challenging, the majority seemed convinced that these three categories constitute the entire realm of possible First
Amendment infringement.2 39
As Justice Souter astutely noted in his dissent, the majority could not
find a controlling precedent for the simple reason that Glickman represented
the first "commercial-speech subsidy case to come before us.""24 While the
majority did recognize that the tree fruit assessments compelled financial
contributions used to fund advertising, they went on to hold that such subsidies did not invoke the interests protected by Abood, which only protected
First Amendment "freedom of belief' interests.2 4 Because the assessments
in question in Glickman "cannot be said to engender any crisis of conscience," the majority reasoned that Abood did not apply and no First
Amendment issue arose.242
Glickman has been criticized by commentators as "a sharp doctrinal
departure, arguably taking a step towards undoing all protection against
'
compelled funding of private expression." 243
The observations of Professor
Casarez suggest that the Glickman majority did not find guiding precedent
because they wrongly determined that the speech in question was not really
speech:
According to the Court, compelled ideological speech and
restricted commercial speech constitute 'speech' in the constitutional sense. However, compelled commercial speech
does not. The only reason given by the Court for this distinction is that commercial speech is not ideological. A
more circular and unsatisfactory answer is hard to imagine. 2"
By so ruling, the Court "failed to expand First Amendment protec-

239. Id. at 470. ("[N]one of our First Amendment jurisprudence provides any support for
the suggestion that the promotional regulations should be scrutinized under a different standard than that applicable to the other anticompetitive features of the marketing orders.").
240.
Id. at 488 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
241.
Gliclnan,521 U.S. at 471 (quoting Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235
(1976)).
242.
Id. at 472.
243.
Howard M. Wasserman, Compelled Expression and the Public Forum Doctrine, 77
T".. L. REv. 163, 204 (2002). With respect to the Glickman majority's focus on whether
respondents in that case agreed or disagreed with the message conveyed by the generic advertising, Wasserman observes that Glicknan contradicts Hurley, where the Supreme Court
stated that "there need not be any articulable message presented for an objector to challenge
the compulsion. If there need not be any clear and articulable message, there need not be
disagreement with any message for an objecting payer to challenge a funding requirement."
Id.
244.
Casarez, supra note 54, at 962.
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tions against compelled speech to the arena of commercial speech."245
That
failure carried with it an even more troubling prospect: that the unpredictable protection of commercial speech afforded by CentralHudson might be
replaced by a more predictable standard ruling out First Amendment scrutiny
entirely.24

The Supreme Court decision in United Foods is the third key precedent considered by the Eighth Circuit in Livestock Marketing. In stopping
short of overruling Glickman, the United Foods decision nonetheless prepared the ground for a return to a higher level of First Amendment protection against compelled subsidies for commercial speech.247 Unfortunately,
the Eighth Circuit seemed content to use the decision in United Foods
merely to draw "the relevant line" establishing that, under Abood, speech
cannot be "germane to itself.""24 As such, the Eighth Circuit held the compelled subsidies under the Beef Act are not germane to a broader regulatory
scheme and so must fail First Amendment scrutiny.
This narrow use of United Foods represents a missed opportunity to
clarify First Amendment jurisprudence in this context because United Foods
stood for much more than a mere germaneness analysis. By choosing to
distinguish rather than overturn Glickman, the majority in United Foods
importantly reinterpreted Abood as being much broader than the majority in
Glickman had presumed.24 9
The Glickman majority claimed that Abood "merely recognized a
First Amendment interest in not being compelled to contribute to an organization whose expressive activities conflict with one's 'freedom of belief." 2
As such, Glickman was distinguished from Abood because "requiring respondents to pay the assessments cannot be said to engender any crisis of
conscience."25 ' As one commentator has observed:
Reconsidering the precedent, the Court in United Foods
reads Abood more broadly and 'take[s] further instruction..
. from Abood's statement that speech need not be characterized as political before it receives First Amendment protec245.
Schoen et al., supranote 225, at 69.
246.
Id. ("In effect the Court expanded the divide between political and ideological
speech, the first tier of protected speech, and commercial speech, the second tier of protected
speech.").
247.
Schoenhard, supra note 222, at 1196 ("United Foods correctly reaffirmed broad pro-

tection for commercial speech.").
248.
Livestock Mktg. Ass'n v. United States Dep't of Agric., 335 F.3d 711, 725 (8th Cir.
2003) (citing United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 415 (2001)).
249.
Schoenhard, supranote 222, at 1196.
250.
Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 471 (1997) (quoting Abood
v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235 (1977)).
251.
Id. at 472.
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tion.' This latter statement of the Court's intent refers to
Justice Stewart's majority opinion in Abood, which repeatedly denies limitation to the First Amendment's coverage.2" 2
A suggestedframework
A broader read of Abood, together with the principles set forth in
Virginia Pharmacy and reinforced by Zauderer, represents the proper
framework in which compelled subsidies for commercial speech should be
afforded a higher degree of First Amendment protection."' Application of
Abood in a commercial context requires the reviewing court to recognize
that First Amendment interests are implicated when individuals are compelled to pay for commercial speech, and Virginia Pharmacy and Zauderer
place constitutional limits upon the purposes for which such speech may be
compelled.
The extension of the Abood germaneness test to the commercial
arena in United Foods is important in the context of commodity checkoff
programs because there are numerous "free-standing" checkoff programs
that exist independently of the much broader regulatory scheme imposed by
the marketing orders at issue in Glickman.2 54 If the Abood germaneness
analysis is applied mechanically to those programs along the lines exercised
both by the Supreme Court in United Foods and by the Eighth Circuit in
Livestock Marketing, then presumably each must fail First Amendment scrutiny." Such a conclusion, however, must be preceded by an analysis of the
programs actually implemented under the authorizing statute in order to determine whether, as the United Foods Court found, the "principal object" of
the program is "speech itself."2 6 Without expressly quantifying the proportion of assessments collected under the Mushroom Act that were devoted to
generic advertising, the Court in United Foods found that "[i]t is undisputed
...that most monies raised by the assessments are spent for generic adver-

252.
Schoenhard, supra note 222, at 1196-97 (quoting United Foods, 533 U.S. at 413).
253.
For a discussion of Virginia Pharmacy, see supra notes 37-44 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of Zauderer, see supra notes 70-76 and accompanying text.
254. See generally United States Dep't of Agric., Agricultural Marketing Service, available at http://www.ams.usda.gov. Promotional activities are authorized by commodityspecific statutes for fourteen different commodities not subject to marketing orders promulgated under the AMAA, 7 U.S.C. § 601 (1999 & Supp. 2003). See United States Dep't of
Agric., Agricultural Marketing Service, available at http://www.ams.usda.gov. There are
thirty-three marketing orders for fruits and vegetables presently active under the authority of
the AMAA, although not all of these have put into effect the generic advertising programs
authorized by that Act. Id.
255.
This assertion follows the United Foods language cited as controlling in Livestock
Marketing: "We have not upheld compelled subsidies for speech in the context of a program
where the principal object is speech itself." Livestock Mktg. Ass'n v. United States Dep't of
Agric., 335 F.3d 711, 725 (2003) (citing United Foods, 533 U.S. at 415).
256.
United Foods, 533 U.S. at 415.
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tising to promote mushroom sales."257
The Court therefore left open the
question, not raised by the Eighth Circuit in the principal case, of whether
the use of a significant portion of assessments for purposes other than generic advertising might allow the statute to survive First Amendment scrutiny.

Such an inquiry is particularly applicable to the beef checkoff, under
which nearly half of all assessments collected are devoted to activities other
than promotion.25 8 Whether these non-promotional activities are either nonexpressive in nature or qualify as a legitimate state interest for which association may be compelled under the rationale of Abood requires a specific
factual inquiry. That inquiry can and should have been conducted in the
principal case within the framework of an Abood germaneness analysis,
since the appellee producers objected to paying for generic advertising, not
to being required to support research and other arguably non-expressive activities. Accepting the Supreme Court's definition of commercial speech as
that which does "no more than propose a commercial transaction," it is reasonable to conclude that generic advertising conducted under the Act qualifies, while research does not.2" 9 If certain activities conducted under the
authority of the Act are legitimate, even as economic regulations, then those
activities provide a basis against which the challenged assessments for generic advertising may be analyzed.
In short, while other programs authorized by and carried out under
the Act may not be as pervasive as the regulatory constraints imposed by a
marketing order, they nevertheless do provide the basis for a more in-depth
analysis than the Eighth Circuit chose to undertake. And, under such an
analysis the challenged assessments need not fail First Amendment scrutiny
under Abood as a fait accompli. To be sure, if the challenged assessments
are found, under an Abood analysis, to not be germane to an underlying and
legitimate associational purpose, then they must fail First Amendment scrutiny.2" If, however, an Abood inquiry finds that the challenged assessments
are germane to a broader purpose, the analysis must proceed to a review of
257. Id. at 408. This finding closed off any analysis of whether such expenditures were
germane to other purposes authorized by the Mushroom Act, which included "projects of
mushroom promotion, research, consumer information, and industry information." Id. (quoting the Mushroom Promotion, Research, and Consumer Info. Act, 7 U.S.C. § 6101,
6104(c)(4) (1999)).
258. 2002 Beef Bd. Annual Report at 16. During fiscal year 2002, fifty-six percent (56%)
of program expenditures under the Act were devoted to promotion. For a complete review of
program expenditures, see supra note 10.
259. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385
(1973).
260. In the context of a public-sector labor union's use of funds for activities not germane
to its role as collective bargaining representative, the Abood Court held that "the Constitution
requires only that such expenditures be financed from charges, dues, or assessments paid by
employees who do not object to advancing those ideas ....
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ.,
431 U.S. 209, 235-36 (1976).
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the nature of the speech funded.
Under this second phase of inquiry, the speech financed by such
compulsory assessments should be analyzed within the constraints imposed
by Virginia Pharmacy,which held that compelled speech may be permissible in a commercial context if the message is designed to prevent deceptive
" '
speech.26
The Supreme Court expressly affirmed such intervention in
Zauderer, holding that "an advertiser's rights are adequately protected as
long as disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the State's interest
in preventing deception of consumers."262 With respect to the importance of
commercial speech generally, Virginia Pharmacyalso recognized an interest
in preserving the free flow of commercial information.26 3 The Zauderer
Court extended recognition of this "free flow" interest beyond the context of
commercial speech restrictions, recognizing that compelling commercial
speech could also, in certain instances, serve the same objective.2" Based on
this dual instruction set forth in Virginia Pharmacy and later affirmed in
Zauderer, compelled checkoff assessments that first survive the Abood germaneness test should subsequently be evaluated to determine whether their
use is intended either to (1) prevent or safeguard against consumer deception, or (2) to preserve and enhance the free flow of commercial information.
A standard designed solely around these limited purposes is a narrow standard indeed, but reflects the importance and validity of the First
Amendment interests at stake. Importantly, however, the Court in Zauderer
held that the disclosure requirement at issue there must be "reasonably related" to the state's interest in preventing consumer deception.26 This language suggest rational basis review of the state-imposed interference so long
as the objective is to advance an interest as legitimate as preventing consumer deception. This choice of language builds on that of Virginia Pharmacy, in which the Court held that a state may not "completely suppress the
dissemination of concededly truthful information about an entirely lawful
activity," but reserved ruling on "other questions" involving other factual
settings."' Taken together, these cases suggest room for judicial deference
in considering legislative attempts to further a legitimate state interest in-

261.
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 772
n.24 (1976).
262.
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S.
626, 651 (1985).
263.
Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765 ("It is a matter of public interest that [private economic decisions], in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this end, the free
flow of commercial information is indispensable.").
264. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 ("Because the extension of First Amendment protection to
commercial speech is justified principally by the value to consumers of the information such
speech provides, appellant's constitutionally protected interest in not providing any particular
factual information in his advertising is minimal.").
265.
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
266.
Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 773.
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tended either to safeguard consumers or protect the free flow of commercial
information by compelling individuals to subsidize commercial speech.
While generic advertising designed to enhance producerreturns might never
qualify under these consumer-oriented targets set forth by the Supreme
Court, application of Abood, Virginia Pharmacy, and Zauderer within the
framework outlined above leaves room for affected industries to tailor their
self-help programs in a more limited manner that comports with First
Amendment protections afforded participating producers.
CONCLUSION

The Eighth Circuit decision in Livestock Marketing Association reflects the unsettled state of First Amendment compelled commercial speech
jurisprudence. Provided with only two Supreme Court cases decided in the
context of commodity checkoff programs, the Eighth Circuit improperly
devised its own legal standard in holding that generic advertising funded by
mandatory assessments collected under the Beef Act violates the First
Amendment rights of objecting producers. While the holding is sound, the
court missed an opportunity to solidify the Supreme Court's extension of
Abood to the commercial speech setting, and failed to draw upon historical
commercial speech guidelines that set forth permissible forms of commercial
speech interference.
Properly applied, the Eighth Circuit should have first conducted an
Abood germaneness analysis of the Beef Act, recognizing that assessments
collected do in fact fund what are arguably non-expressive activities such as
research and consumer information. Those activities constitute a regulatory
scheme separate from the speech itself that serves as the basis for an Abood
analysis, and a factual inquiry would likely reveal that the generic advertising in question is indeed germane to that underlying regulatory scheme.
Having passed the germaneness test, the analysis should continue by reviewing the limitations on commercial speech interference set forth in Virginia
Pharmacyand Zauderer. Those decisions limit First Amendment protection
for commercial speech interference to activities designed to advance the
related state interests of preventing consumer deception and preserving the
free flow of commercial information. If a factual inquiry reveals that generic advertising conducted under the Beef Act is intended to benefit producer interests rather than those limited consumer interests identified by the
Supreme Court, the assessments should fail as impermissible compelled
commercial speech in violation of the First Amendment free speech rights of
objecting producers. Other non-expressive regulatory programs carried out
under the authority of the Beef Act should be upheld under rational basis
review as economic regulations, and industry should not be precluded from
engaging in self-help activities that are legitimately designed to further the
state's interest in protecting consumers.
BRET Fox
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